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GOLDILOCKS AND THE RULE 803 HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
LIESA L. RICHTER*
ABSTRACT
Criticism of the hearsay exceptions embodied in the Federal Rules
of Evidence has reached a fever pitch in recent years. With scholars
calling for the abrogation of the entire hearsay regime or of individ-
ual exceptions within it and the Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules exploring hearsay amendments, the time for genuine hearsay
soul-searching may be at hand.  This Article suggests that aggressive
proposals to scuttle existing doctrine entirely in favor of alternative
approaches to hearsay are overly broad, rejecting the benefits of
significant portions of existing doctrine that are functioning well and
threatening costly consequences that could make matters worse for
hearsay. On the opposite end of the spectrum, narrow proposals to
amend individual hearsay exceptions one at a time accomplish too
little and may undermine the utility of long-standing and rational
hearsay exceptions that permit the flow of helpful information into
the trial process.
As an alternative to these proposals at opposite ends of the
spectrum, this Article reveals a ready hearsay reform right under our
noses that hits that sweet spot in between a sweeping, aggressive
reform and an unduly narrow, limited fix. The Article suggests
borrowing the trustworthiness exception that is a current feature of
the business and public records exceptions and extending its
application to additional hearsay exceptions in Federal Rule of
Evidence 803. This change would make hearsay statements falling
within the existing requirements of the Rule 803 exceptions presump-
tively admissible, but would afford the opponent of those hearsay
statements the opportunity to show that the particular circumstances
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surrounding the statements render them untrustworthy and
inadmissible. Fleshing out this concept first advanced in my previous
work, this Article explains why an expanded trustworthiness
exception could be the silver bullet that takes an important step
toward rationalizing hearsay doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
The hearsay regime embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence
has long been a favorite target for criticism. Scholars, judges, and
lawyers alike have lamented the complexity, inefficiency, and irra-
tionality of the hearsay prohibition and its multifarious exceptions.
Although criticizing the existing hearsay regime is as easy as shoot-
ing fish in a barrel, finding a cure for what ails hearsay doctrine has
proved a much harder task. Although complaints about the
inadequacy of hearsay doctrine have continued unabated, there has
been no significant overhaul of the hearsay regime since the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.
Two recent trends have placed hearsay reform back in the
limelight. First, the rapid evolution of communication norms that
has generated an avalanche of electronic hearsay, or e-hearsay, has
led to a reexamination of hearsay doctrine.1 Coinciding with the rise
of e-hearsay is a modern emphasis on data-driven, empirically
supported legal constructs that has pulled hearsay doctrine back
into the spotlight, or the crosshairs as it were.2 In light of these
trends, scholars have advanced many intriguing proposals for
reform. Some have suggested a complete overhaul of hearsay
doctrine that would scrap the long-standing and arcane hearsay
regime in search of a brave new hearsay world.3 On the opposite end
of the spectrum, others have advanced narrow proposals to modify,
1. See generally Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of Present
Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331 (2012) [hereinafter Bellin, Facebook] (advocating
corroboration limitation on present sense impression exception to control flow of electronic
hearsay); Jeffrey Bellin, The Case for eHearsay, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317 (2014) [hereinafter
Bellin, Case for eHearsay] (responding to scholars’ concerns about proposed e-hearsay
exception to the existing hearsay regime to allow for increased flow of electronic
communications into the trial process); Liesa L. Richter, Don’t Just Do Something!: E-
Hearsay, the Present Sense Impression, and the Case for Caution in the Rulemaking Process,
61 AM. U. L. REV. 1657 (2012).
2. See United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 800-01 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.,
concurring); Justin Sevier, Popularizing Hearsay, 104 GEO. L.J. 643 (2016) (conducting an
empirical analysis of juror reactions to hearsay).
3. See Boyce, 742 F.3d at 802; see also Sevier, supra note 2, at 648 (proposing a
“procedural justice” overhaul of hearsay rules).
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abolish, or create specific hearsay exceptions only within the exist-
ing, complex hearsay structure.4
In the wake of recent vocal and high-profile criticism of hearsay,5
real hearsay reform is finally under consideration. Defying critics’
constant refrain that genuine hearsay reform is unlikely due to
incuriosity and a reluctance to reconsider ancient dogma,6 the
Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence has signaled
serious interest in making significant modifications to the hearsay
model contained in Article Eight of the Rules, proposing and
obtaining amendments to hearsay provisions in 2010, 2014, and
2015.7 Further, the Advisory Committee is considering more wide-
spread and significant modifications to hearsay doctrine. Among
other proposals, the Committee has raised the possibility of expand-
ing the hearsay exception for prior inconsistent statements of
testifying witnesses8 and has considered expanding the residual or
catchall exception to allow for more liberal admission of hearsay
outside the standard categorical exceptions.9 The Committee has
even examined the possibility of returning to a drafting alternative
4. See Bellin, Facebook, supra note 1, at 375; Bellin, Case for eHearsay, supra note 1, at
1318-19, 1326-27; see also Steven Baicker-McKee, The Excited Utterance Paradox, 41 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 111 (2017) (proposing abrogation of the excited utterance exception); Alan G.
Williams, Abolishing the Excited Utterance Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay, 63 U. KAN.
L. REV. 717, 758 (2015) (proposing a Rule that requires corroboration of excited utterances,
as well as declarant unavailability).
5. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, On Hearsay, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1465, 1466, 1471 (2016).
6. Cf. Panel Discussion, Symposium on Hearsay Reform, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1323, 1327-
28 (2016) (comments of the Honorable Jeffrey S. Sutton).
7. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendments; FED. R. EVID.
803(6)-(8) advisory committee’s notes to 2014 amendments; FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory
committee’s note to 2014 amendments; see also SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 803 (2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
2017-04-27-congressional_package_rev._4-25_final_final_with_signed_letters_and_orders_
o.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4A8-9KRT].
8. Memorandum from Daniel J. Capra, Reporter to the Advisory Comm. on Evidence
Rules, to the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules 1-2, 4 (Oct. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Capra
Memorandum on Possible Amendment, 2016], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
2016-10-evidence-agenda-book.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3T7-4WJK] (regarding possible
amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)).
9. Memorandum from Daniel J. Capra, Reporter to the Advisory Comm. on Evidence
Rules, to the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules 2, 6 (Oct. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Capra Memo-
randum on Expanding the Residual Exception], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
2016-10-evidence-agenda-book.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3T7-4WJK] (regarding expanding the
residual exception to the hearsay rule).
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that the original drafters of the Rules left on the cutting room floor:
using the categorical hearsay exceptions merely as illustrations or
guidelines that trial judges may follow—or not—in their significant
discretion.10 In short, an era of genuine hearsay reform may finally
be at hand.
If, at long last, significant alterations are to be made to the time-
honored and byzantine hearsay rules, it is critical that we avoid a
false step that would condemn hearsay doctrine to a future of
continued dysfunction and criticism. This Article suggests that
aggressive proposals to scuttle existing doctrine entirely in favor of
alternative approaches to hearsay are overly broad, rejecting the
benefits of significant portions of existing doctrine that are function-
ing well, and threatening costly consequences that could make
matters worse for hearsay. On the opposite end of the spectrum,
narrow proposals to amend individual hearsay exceptions one at a
time accomplish too little and may undermine the utility of long-
standing and rational hearsay exceptions that permit the flow of
helpful information into the trial process.
As an alternative to these proposals at opposite ends of the
spectrum, this Article reveals a ready hearsay reform right under
our noses that hits that sweet spot in between a sweeping, aggres-
sive reform and an unduly narrow, limited fix. The Article suggests
borrowing the trustworthiness exception that is a current feature of
the business and public records exceptions and extending its
application to other hearsay exceptions in Rule 803. This change
would make hearsay statements falling within the existing require-
ments of the Rule 803 exceptions presumptively admissible, but
would afford the opponent of those hearsay statements the opportu-
nity to show that the particular circumstances surrounding the
statements render them untrustworthy and inadmissible. After
fleshing out this concept first advanced in my previous work,11 this
Article explains why expanding the trustworthiness exception would
represent an important step toward rationalizing hearsay doctrine.
10. See Memorandum from Daniel J. Capra, Reporter to the Advisory Comm. on Evidence
Rules, to the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules 1-2 (Apr. 29, 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/2016-04-evidence-agenda_book_final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8AY-HH9F]
(regarding changing the categorical hearsay exceptions to guidelines).
11. See Liesa L. Richter, Reality Check: A Modest Modification to Rationalize Rule 803
Hearsay Exceptions, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473 (2016).
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Notwithstanding the numerous and varied attacks on existing
hearsay doctrine, all roads lead back to the Rule 803 exceptions.
Hysteria over the present sense impression and excited utterance
exceptions, in particular, has formed a launching pad for some
reform proposals, as well as a landing place for others.12 Expanding
the trustworthiness exception that already exists in the Rule 803
hearsay exceptions for business and public records efficiently
launches a single silver bullet at numerous purported reliability
deficiencies in the remaining Rule 803 hearsay exceptions.13
Importantly, it would do so without altering the presumptive ad-
missibility of hearsay falling within the well-understood Rule 803
categories and without sacrificing critical certainty and predictabil-
ity in the litigation process.14 Finally, expanding the trustworthiness
exception would bring much-needed systemic symmetry to the Arti-
cle Eight hearsay regime, providing an escape valve to exclude
unreliable hearsay that satisfies preordained hearsay exceptions to
match the residual exception in Rule 807 that allows the admission
of trustworthy hearsay not captured by those same exceptions.15
Accomplishing all of this with a known and understood feature of
the business and public records exceptions would not wreak the
havoc on our hearsay model that paradigm-shifting reforms are sure
to bring.16
Part I of this Article will briefly describe common criticisms of the
hearsay regime found in the Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as
recent proposals for reform. Part I will also identify significant flaws
in existing proposals for hearsay reform. In Part II, the Article will
explain the operation of the trustworthiness exception currently
part of the business and public records exceptions. Part II will
demonstrate that expanding this trustworthiness exception to
additional Rule 803 hearsay exceptions is in keeping with the values
underlying the hearsay rule and is superior to the alternatives for
rationalizing hearsay doctrine. Part III will explore the mechanics
12. See United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (describing Judge Richard Posner’s critique of the Rules, a critique which begins
and ends with the Rule 803 exceptions).
13. See infra Part II.C.2.
14. See infra Part II.C.2.
15. See infra Part II.C.4.
16. See infra Part II.C.6.
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of expanding the trustworthiness exception and will propose
potential amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 803. The Article
will then briefly conclude.
I. THE FEDERAL HEARSAY REGIME AND ITS HATERS
Hearsay is defined by Federal Rule of Evidence 801 as “a state-
ment that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the
current trial or hearing” that “(2) a party offers in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”17 The hearsay
regime embodied in the Rules imposes a broad ban on the admission
of hearsay evidence,18 only to turn around and articulate thirty-
seven circumstances in which hearsay statements may indeed be
admitted for their truth.19 The hearsay exceptions within Article
Eight of the Rules follow a “categorical” approach, admitting state-
ments that meet certain defined requirements and that fit into
preordained categories.20
Hearsay exceptions covering statements made by testifying wit-
nesses satisfy core hearsay concerns by requiring an opportunity for
declarant cross-examination,21 while the exceptions for statements
of party-opponents are based upon notions of adversarial fairness.22
The hearsay exceptions in Rule 803 predominantly rest upon the
assumption that human statements made in certain defined
contexts enjoy inherent reliability,23 while the Rule 804 exceptions
17. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
18. See FED. R. EVID. 802 (excluding hearsay evidence unless the Federal Rules provide
otherwise).
19. FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (listing eight conditions under which a statement is not hearsay);
FED. R. EVID. 803 (listing twenty-three statement categories that “are not excluded by the rule
against hearsay”); FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (listing five statement types that “are not excluded by
the rule against hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness”); FED. R. EVID. 807
(creating one “residual exception” that enables a court to admit a hearsay statement under
certain circumstances “even if the statement is not specifically covered by” the other thirty-six
hearsay exceptions listed elsewhere in the Rules).
20. See 4 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:66
(4th ed. 2013) (discussing the prescriptive nature of categorical exceptions).
21. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) (requiring that declarant be “subject to cross-examination
about a prior statement”).
22. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules (indicating
adversarial fairness as the key to party-opponent statements).
23. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules (creating
limited hearsay exceptions because “under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement
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rest on both the reliability of certain hearsay statements and the
necessity of resorting to those hearsay statements in the case of a
declarant unavailable to testify at trial.24 Finally, Rule 807 rounds
out the list with a discretionary catchall exception available in cases
of trustworthy and necessary hearsay not covered by the other
categorical exceptions.25
The mixed messages of the hearsay prohibition and its many
exceptions, as well as the patchwork quilt of particular hearsay
statements allowable in evidence, have been attacked from all
quarters since the adoption of the Rules in 1975. Critiques of
contemporary hearsay doctrine and proposals for reform have been
almost too numerous to tally over the past forty-plus years.26
Although the long-standing dissatisfaction with the treatment of
hearsay by the Rules is well documented, there appears to be a
recently renewed enthusiasm for revisiting the fundamentals of the
hearsay regime. Recent critiques and proposals for change have
been driven partly by the advent of ubiquitous technology and the
metamorphosis in methods of human communication.27 In addition,
a contemporary call for data-driven, empirically sound legal prin-
ciples has drawn hearsay doctrine back into the limelight.28
may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness”).
24. FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (allowing hearsay statements to be admitted only if the declarant
is unavailable to testify). 
25. See FED. R. EVID. 807.
26. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis
of Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REV. 723, 724 (1992) (suggesting a hearsay model based upon a
determination about which party should bear the cost of producing the hearsay declarant);
Paul S. Milich, Hearsay Antinomies: The Case for Abolishing the Rule and Starting Over, 71
OR. L. REV. 723, 774 (1992) (proposing the broadening of admissible hearsay with procedural
protections); Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51,
54 (1987) (proposing expanded admissibility of hearsay in civil cases); Michael L. Seigel,
Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. REV. 893, 896-
97 (1992) (proposing a hearsay framework designed to determine when hearsay evidence
constitutes the best available evidence); Sevier, supra note 2, at 648 (proposing a “procedural
justice” model of hearsay reform); Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75
CALIF. L. REV. 1339, 1341-43 (1987) (suggesting the admission of more factual information to
assist juries in evaluating hearsay in place of the restrictive exclusion of hearsay evidence).
27. See supra note 6.
28. See, e.g., Baicker-McKee, supra note 4.
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A. Contemporary Calls for Change
In response to evolving methods of communication and our
increasing faith in empirically supported standards, there have been
several recent calls to reinvent the hearsay regime embodied in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. While some scholars have called for a
complete overhaul of the hearsay scheme, others have proposed
more targeted refinements to particular hearsay exceptions.
Judge Richard Posner dropped a bombshell on traditional hearsay
doctrine in a 2014 concurrence in United States v. Boyce.29 Boyce
was a routine appeal of a felon-in-possession conviction, in which
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the lower court’s
admission of statements made to a 911 operator through the present
sense impression and excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay
rule found in Federal Rule of Evidence 803.30 Although the panel
unanimously upheld the admission of the statements through the
excited utterance exception,31 Judge Posner seized upon the
opportunity to discredit the rationales supporting both the present
sense impression and excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay
ban.32
Specifically, Judge Posner questioned the assumption inherent in
the present sense impression that contemporaneous observation and
speech negate deliberate misrepresentation, pointing to studies
suggesting that most lies are spontaneous rather than planned33
and “that less than one second is required to fabricate a lie.”34 Judge
Posner concluded his discussion of the present sense impression by
stating that the exception “has neither a theoretical nor an empiri-
cal basis; and it’s not even common sense—it’s not even good folk
29. 742 F.3d 792, 799-802 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 793, 796-99 (majority opinion); see also Liesa L. Richter, Posnerian Hearsay:
Slaying the Discretion Dragon, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1861, 1876-81 (2015).
31. Boyce, 742 F.3d at 799.
32. Id. at 799-802 (Posner, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 800-01 (citing Monica T. Whitty et al., Not All Lies Are Spontaneous: An
Examination of Deception Across Different Modes of Communication, 63 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO.
SCI. & TECH. 208, 208-09, 214 (2012)). Judge Posner also noted judicial opinions broadly
interpreting the timing requirement of the present sense impression “to encompass periods
as long as 23 minutes.” Id. at 800 (citing United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 785-86 (7th
Cir. 1979)).
34. Id. at 801 (quoting Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 588 (7th Cir. 2004)).
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psychology.”35 Judge Posner expressed similar disdain for the
excited utterance exception, noting that even the advisory commit-
tee notes supporting the exception are equivocal with respect to the
effect of excitement upon fabrication.36 Assuming that the excite-
ment produced by a startling event minimizes self-interest and
reflection, Judge Posner highlighted scholarship questioning
whether “the distorting effect of shock” might undermine the
reliability of excited utterances.37 According to Judge Posner, once
stripped of their purported justifications, the present sense impres-
sion and excited utterance exceptions are nothing more “than
judicial habit, in turn reflecting judicial incuriosity and reluctance
to reconsider ancient dogmas.”38 Driven by this scathing indictment
of the present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions,
Judge Posner offered his vision for improving contemporary hearsay
doctrine. Echoing a proposal rejected by the original drafters of the
Rules, Judge Posner suggested that allowing the existing “[r]esid-
ual” or catchall exception to swallow and displace the categorical
exceptions would constitute a superior and workable approach to
hearsay evidence.39 This approach would require discretionary,
statement-by-statement reliability determinations by the trial judge
to assess the admissibility of all hearsay.40
In 2016, Professor Justin Sevier critiqued the hearsay regime’s
reliance on notions of reliability and “decisional accuracy,” and
proposed transformation of hearsay doctrine to emphasize “a pro-
cedural justice rationale.”41 In keeping with burgeoning empirical
35. Id. at 801.
36. Id. (emphasizing that the advisory committee’s notes provide only that excitement
“may ... produce[ ] utterances free of conscious fabrication”).
37. Id. at 801-02 (quoting 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 272 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 7th
ed. 2014)).
38. Id. at 802.
39. Id. Judge Posner later revised his call to toss out all hearsay exceptions in Boyce, still
keeping Rule 803 exceptions like the present sense impression and excited utterance
exceptions in his cross-hairs. Posner, supra note 5, at 1467, 1470-71 (“I can imagine benefits
from allowing Rule 807 ... to swallow much of Rules 801 through 806” but expressly calling
for abrogation of the present sense impression, excited utterance, and dying declarations
exceptions).
40. See FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(1) (providing a court discretion to admit a hearsay statement
with “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” as those statements covered
“in Rule 803 or 804”).
41. See Sevier, supra note 2, at 648.
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inquiries in legal scholarship, Professor Sevier conducted a survey
of laypeople cast as jurors in hypothetical trial scenarios involving
variations in the use of hearsay.42 Based upon survey responses,
Professor Sevier concluded that juror rejection of hearsay stemmed
from concerns over fairness or “procedural injustice” when hearsay
declarants were able to implicate various litigants without subject-
ing themselves to cross-examination.43 Conversely, lay jurors
expressed little concern for the reliability or “decisional accuracy” of
hearsay evidence, according to Professor Sevier.44 Based upon the
reactions of lay jurors to hearsay evidence, therefore, Professor
Sevier recommended “[p]opularizing [h]earsay” and reforming the
doctrine to satisfy notions of procedural justice that arise from in-
court cross-examination and to depart from any reliability rationale
for hearsay doctrine.45 Although Professor Sevier did not articulate
a comprehensive and concrete proposal for reform, he suggested
eliminating the “dubious” hearsay exceptions in Rule 803, in
keeping with Judge Posner’s critique of those exceptions.46
Other proposals for hearsay reform have targeted specific hearsay
exceptions more directly. For example, in 2012, Professor Jeffrey
Bellin called for the amendment of the present sense impression
exception to add a corroboration requirement.47 Professor Bellin ably
illustrated the rapid revolution in modern human communication
and suggested that the original reliability assumptions underlying
the present sense impression exception were threatened by
contemporary and unforeseen e-hearsay.48 Professor Bellin posited
that the addition of a corroboration component to the existing re-
quirements of the present sense impression exception would restore
the reliability originally intended by drafters of the exception.49 In
a similar vein, in 2015, Professor Alan Williams proposed an
amendment to the excited utterance exception, suggesting that the
42. Id. at 652 (citing Justin Sevier, Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and
Psychological Distance, 103 GEO. L.J. 879, 903-15 (2015)).
43. Id. at 677-78.
44. Id. at 678.
45. Id. at 688-90. 
46. Id. at 662-63.
47. See Bellin, Facebook, supra note 1, at 338.
48. Id. at 337-38.
49. Id.
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exception be transplanted into Rule 804, where declarant unavail-
ability is required, and that a corroborating circumstances re-
quirement be added.50 Going one step further, Professor Steven
Baicker-McKee recently proposed the abrogation of the excited
utterance exception altogether.51
Recent concern over the contemporary viability and legitimacy of
hearsay doctrine has not been confined to academics and scholars,
however. The Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence
has demonstrated a renewed interest in updating and refining the
federal hearsay regime. In 2010, the declarations against interest
hearsay exception was modified to expand its “corroborating
circumstances requirement ... to all declarations against penal
interest offered in criminal cases.”52 In 2014, the business and public
records exceptions were amended to clarify that “the burden is on
the opponent to show that the source of information or the method
or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness”
once the proponent of the hearsay establishes the stated require-
ments of the hearsay exceptions.53 Also in 2014, the Advisory
Committee secured an amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B),54 resolving
the long-standing debate over the underinclusive operation of the
hearsay exception for prior consistent statements.55 In 2015, the
Advisory Committee proposed the abolition of the “ancient docu-
ments” hearsay exception, emphasizing the tidal wave of stored
electronic communications that would quickly become admissible
through the exception and the absence of any inherent reliability
based solely on the age of hearsay.56 The Advisory Committee
50. Williams, supra note 4, at 757-58.
51. Baicker-McKee, supra note 4.
52. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendments. 
53. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendments (amending the
business records exception); FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee’s note to 2014
amendments (amending the public records exception).
54. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendments.
55. Liesa L. Richter, Seeking Consistency for Prior Consistent Statements: Amending
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), 46 CONN. L. REV. 937, 941-42 (2014) (proposing
revisions to amended hearsay exception for prior consistent statements).
56. See Memorandum from Daniel J. Capra, Reporter to the Advisory Comm. on Evidence
Rules, to the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules 1 (Apr. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Capra
Memorandum on Proposal to Eliminate the Ancient Documents Exception], http://www.us
courts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-04-evidence-agenda_book_final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9RSD-3XJ6] (describing a proposal to eliminate the ancient documents exception to the
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revised that proposal in light of public comment in 2016, recom-
mending that the ancient documents exception be preserved only for
documents created before January 1, 1998—a date chosen to reflect
the advent of ubiquitous electronically stored information.57 In 2016
and 2017, the Committee also explored the possibility of amending
the hearsay exception covering prior inconsistent statements of
testifying witnesses,58 as well as the residual or catchall exception
to the hearsay rule.59 With scholars pushing for the modernization
of hearsay doctrine and the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules
rolling up its sleeves to explore the feasibility of meaningful change,
the time is ripe for genuine hearsay soul-searching and updates to
the time-honored hearsay regime embodied in the Rules.
B. Fatal Flaws in Recent Reform Proposals
Many of the recent scholarly proposals for hearsay reform high-
light legitimate concerns about the federal hearsay regime and
articulate thought-provoking innovations to modernize that regime.
Still, many of these critiques exaggerate the shortcomings of the
existing hearsay exceptions and suggest reforms that promise to
create as many problems as they resolve.
Judge Posner’s proposal for the discretionary treatment of
hearsay evidence is a prime example.60 Although the assumptions
regarding human communication and motivation underlying some
of the hearsay exceptions within the Rules may be imperfect, Judge
hearsay rule).
57. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, MEETING OF JUNE 6, 2016 MINUTES
3 (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/st06-2016-min_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
NJ8K-DQQV] (describing a proposed revision to a Rule 803(16) amendment and unanimously
approving it “for submission to the Judicial Conference”).
58. See Memorandum from Daniel J. Capra, Reporter to the Advisory Comm. on Evidence
Rules, to the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules (Oct. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Capra Memoran-
dum on Possible Amendment, 2017], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/a3_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GMK6-L5U5] (describing continuing consideration of potential amendments
to Rule 801(d)(7)(A)).
59. See Capra Memorandum on Expanding the Residual Exception, supra note 9 (explor-
ing potential amendments to the residual exception). The Advisory Committee proposed an
amendment to Rule 807 in 2017, which was published for notice and comment in August 2017.
See Capra Memorandum on Possible Amendment, 2017, supra note 58, at 1.
60. See United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 799-802 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
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Posner’s broad assertion that they lack any rational foundation
appears overblown.61 Furthermore, Judge Posner’s proposed fix—
abolishing all of the categorical hearsay exceptions in favor of a
purely discretionary approach to all hearsay evidence—threatens to
impose prohibitive costs on the trial process.62 As explored in depth
in my previous work, Judge Posner’s proposal wields a sledgeham-
mer where a scalpel could suffice, eliminating all categorical
hearsay exceptions due to articulated concerns regarding only a
few.63 In addition, a single discretionary standard would undermine
the crucial ability of litigants to predict the admissibility of hearsay
evidence in advance as they craft a litigation strategy.64 Such an
approach also threatens to create unfair inconsistency in the
admissibility of hearsay evidence “across cases and courtrooms.”65
The discretionary administration of hearsay doctrine would likely
increase transaction costs associated with hearsay evidence, requir-
ing motions in limine, pretrial hearings, and briefings to ascertain
the admissibility of evidence currently dictated by the categorical
exceptions.66 Finally, after displacing our entire system of well-
understood hearsay exceptions, a discretionary reform would still
utilize empirically suspect judicial determinations of “reliability” to
determine admissibility.67 In sum, scrapping all of the categorical
hearsay exceptions in favor of a single discretionary standard is a
game that is not worth the candle.
Replacing the reliability-based hearsay exceptions with a
procedural test that emphasizes declarant cross-examination is a
tempting alternative that could simplify our notoriously complex
hearsay system.68 That said, Professor Sevier’s recent proposal to
abandon the reliability or “decisional accuracy” rationale that
underscores many of our existing hearsay exceptions in favor of a
“procedural justice” model presents other difficulties.69 Dismantling
61. See Richter, supra note 30, at 1867.
62. See id. at 1882-86.
63. See id. at 1895-96.
64. Id. at 1884.
65. Id. at 1894.
66. Id. at 1882-83.
67. Id. at 1892-94.
68. See id. at 1905 (suggesting that a procedural hearsay test that discards reliability
could provide consistency). 
69. See Sevier, supra note 2.
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suspect pieces of the larger hearsay puzzle may be child’s play, but
constructing a viable and comprehensive alternative hearsay regime
is a tall order. While Professor Sevier makes a few concrete sugges-
tions to eliminate the “dubious” Rule 803 exceptions and to ban
testimonial hearsay in civil cases,70 he offers no comprehensive
description of a new hearsay order defined by procedural justice
alone. Do we eliminate the crucial business records exception in the
absence of a declarant who can be cross-examined on the content of
the records? If Professor Sevier would retain the business records
exception, as he suggests he might,71 how do we justify its continued
existence without relying on notions of reliability?
Truly adopting a strict “procedural justice” focus for hearsay rules
is problematic in other respects. The rejected Model Code version of
hearsay doctrine reflected a procedural emphasis on the availability
of cross-examination, allowing hearsay to be admitted whenever the
declarant could be cross-examined at trial or when the declarant
was truly unavailable to testify subject to cross-examination.72 This
proposal was, of course, met with a severely negative reaction based
largely on concerns regarding the reliability of the hearsay state-
ments that would be admitted in such a scheme.73 If we update the
Model Code construct to allow all hearsay of testifying witnesses,
but none from declarants who fail to appear for cross-examination,
we will still have reliability concerns surrounding some hearsay
statements of testifying witnesses, as well as a net loss of probative
evidence from absent declarants that may ultimately undermine our
ability to resolve disputes.
Of even more fundamental concern is Professor Sevier’s ultimate
call to “popularize” hearsay by relying on lay jurors’ assessments of
evidentiary values to construct our modern hearsay regime.74
Distrust of jurors’ abilities to make rational and fair decisions about
70. Id. at 662, 664.
71. See id. at 663.
72. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE r. 503 (AM. LAW INST. 1942). 
73. See Michael Ariens, A Short History of Hearsay Reform, with Particular Reference to
Hoffman v. Palmer, Eddie Morgan, and Jerry Frank, 28 IND. L. REV. 183, 222-26 (1995); David
Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 20 (“[The] professional reception
[for the Model Rules] ... varied between chilliness and heated antagonism.” (omission in
original) (quoting JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW
153 (1947))).
74. See Sevier, supra note 2, at 688.
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the value of evidence is at the very heart of our Rules.75 To turn the
reins over to jurors in deciding whether and why to consider hearsay
evidence is to put the fox in charge of the hearsay henhouse.76 Of
course, empirical work that assesses the extent to which jurors rely
upon hearsay is very helpful in exploring the long-debated issue of
whether jurors are capable of evaluating hearsay evidence and could
be used to justify admitting more hearsay.77 But that is a different
question from the recent question explored by Professor Sevier,
which is why jurors dislike hearsay.78 Modifying our hearsay regime
to conform to the preferences and values of lay jurors is a controver-
sial concept that threatens the existence of evidence rules.
The fundamental problem with this approach can be illustrated
by extending Professor Sevier’s hearsay proposal to other areas of
evidence. Studies could assess lay jurors’ reactions to the admissibil-
ity of past convictions; other crimes, wrongs, or acts; or even simple
character evidence. If lay jurors largely favor broad consideration of
all of this evidence in aiding in their full and fair consideration of a
case, Professor Sevier’s analysis suggests that we should admit it
all.79 Indeed, it is common for members of the public to feel a sense
of outrage following an unpopular verdict after learning that a jury
was not informed of information lay persons consider relevant and
fair.80 Because evidence rules are designed to eliminate what might
be the “popular” approach to certain types of evidence, reforms that
take hearsay doctrine wherever lay jurors wish to go are ill advised.
75. See Williams, supra note 4, at 718.
76. Legitimacy is, of course, an important component of evidentiary doctrine, if not the
sole consideration. See Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance
of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367, 395 (1992) (noting that “rules of procedure and evidence
should provide reason for confidence that courts reach correct outcomes by fair means” and
explaining that “the [hearsay] doctrine reflects a kind of common sense to which lay people
can relate”).
77. See Justin Sevier, Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and Psychological
Distance, 103 GEO. L.J. 879, 893-96 (2015) (discussing over a dozen studies that challenge the
proposition that juries overvalue hearsay evidence).
78. See Sevier, supra note 2, at 648.
79. See id. at 688.
80. See Conference on Possible Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b), 807, and
801(D)(1)(a), 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1517, 1522 (2017) (remarks of Judge David Hamilton
concerning developments in Rule 404(b)) (“I would always talk with jurors after every verdict
and every jury in every criminal case had the same first question: ‘Has he done this before?’
That’s what they wanted to know to reinforce the guilty verdict.”). 
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In addition to the specific drawbacks inherent in each of these
proposals to remake hearsay doctrine, there is a more generalized
concern that plagues many transformative proposals to discard
existing doctrine entirely in favor of a brave new world. Such
reactionary reforms often result in a pendular approach to legal
problems that ultimately may prove deleterious. Law reform that
swings wildly between competing philosophies may squander
benefits offered at both ends of the spectrum, forcing a painful
process of correcting toward the middle. Examples in legal evolution
abound. In the products liability arena, proindustry doctrine was
replaced with the proconsumer strict liability concepts in section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.81 The Restatement
(Third) of Torts on Products Liability offered important corrective
clarifications, restoring negligence-based principles in connection
with claims of failure to warn82 and defective design.83 In 1938, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ushered in liberal “notice pleading”
as a reaction to the highly detailed factual content required in the
code pleading era.84 As interpreted under Conley v. Gibson, this
forgiving notice pleading standard provided that a plaintiff ’s
“complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”85 The
Supreme Court famously retired the liberal Conley standard in
deciding the Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal
cases in 2007 and 2009, respectively, requiring sufficient, well-
pleaded factual allegations to demonstrate a “plausible” claim for
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (allowing strict seller
liability for unreasonably dangerous consumer products).
82. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1998)
(imposing liability for failure to warn “when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings ..., and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not
reasonably safe”).
83. Id. § 2(b) (imposing liability for design defects only for “foreseeable risks of harm,” if
a “reasonable alternative design” was available, “and the omission of the alternative design
renders the product not reasonably safe”).
84. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring only “a short and plain statement of a claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ”).
85. 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (citing Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944);
Cont’l Collieries v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1942); Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assurance
Co., 108 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1940)).
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relief.86 In both of these examples, reformers sought to reject an
imperfect status quo by substituting an opposite regime, only to
work back toward a compromise position.87
Although some natural corrective adjustments may be un-
avoidable in moving the law forward, as illustrated by the above
examples, hearsay reformers could avoid wild swings and time-
consuming efforts to backtrack by amending only the hearsay
provisions that operate suboptimally, while leaving the remainder
of the hearsay regime intact. The many benefits achieved by the
highly successful Federal Rules of Evidence would be retained and
specific points of constant friction could be corrected. Rather than
discarding all of hearsay doctrine, reformers could implement
important tweaks to Rule 803 and allow time to attain experience
with those modest reforms before proceeding more aggressively.
In contrast to proposals to overhaul the entire hearsay scheme in
Article Eight, the past few years have seen some intriguing
proposals to reform only single hearsay exceptions within Rule
803.88 Where broad proposals to overhaul the entire hearsay regime
may be difficult to craft and may create unintended consequences,
the single exception approach to hearsay reform can offer only a
partial and incomplete resolution of hearsay flaws while producing
problems of its own.89 For example, adding a corroboration require-
ment to the present sense impression exception to resolve reliability
concerns regarding the admissibility of e-hearsay fails to address
similar concerns in the admission of e-hearsay through the excited
utterance and state of mind exceptions.90 Similarly, adding corrobo-
ration and unavailability requirements to the excited utterance
86. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-57 (2007) (“Factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” (citing 5 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)));
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) (requiring plaintiffs to “plead sufficient factual
matter to show that petitioners adopted and implemented the detention policies at issue not
for a neutral, investigative reason but for the purpose of discriminating”).
87. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-87; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-63.
88. See generally Baicker-McKee, supra note 4; Bellin, Facebook, supra note 1; Bellin,
Case for eHearsay, supra note 1; Williams, supra note 4. 
89. See Victor Gold, The Three Commandments of Amending the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1615, 1624-25 (2017) (noting risks of focusing on amendments
to single rules of evidence).
90. See Richter, supra note 1, at 1707.
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exception may respond to criticisms of the reliability assumptions
underlying that one exception, but does nothing to answer similar
concerns that plague other hearsay exceptions, such as the present
sense impression or the dying declaration.91 It is costly and inef-
ficient to amend hearsay exceptions one at a time to address relia-
bility concerns common to many of them.92 In addition, single
exception reforms increase the already-derided complexity of the
hearsay regime, adding multiple exception-specific requirements to
memorize, interpret, and apply.93
Finally, many of the proposed single exception reforms would add
limitations that would drastically limit the utility of the hearsay
exceptions in routine core applications to address concerns in rare
cases they seek to improve. As explored in my previous work,
requiring corroboration of all present sense impressions could se-
verely curtail important and common applications of the exception,
particularly in the domestic violence context.94 Similar concerns
would attend limiting the admission of excited utterances to cir-
cumstances where there is sufficient corroboration and demonstra-
ble unavailability of the declarant. Many of the single exception
reforms pose solutions that would kill the patient to prevent a
moderate infection. Indeed, Professor Williams aptly titled his
proposal to add corroboration and unavailability requirements to
the excited utterance exception: Abolishing the Excited Utterance
Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay.95
Of the many intriguing and thought-provoking proposals to
improve a rather arcane hearsay regime operating in a contempo-
rary context, none has offered a silver bullet that promises to help
more than it hurts. Dismantling the entire hearsay regime in search
of a brave new world will surely cause damaging disruption in the
litigation process and may generate more systemic concerns than it
will resolve. Conversely, applying band-aids to single hearsay
exceptions one at a time may do little to assuage broader concerns
and may even undermine the legitimate value of those exceptions.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 1706.
93. See id. at 1706, 1708-09.
94. Id. at 1701-03.
95. See Williams, supra note 4; see also Baicker-McKee, supra note 4.
2018] GOLDILOCKS AND THE RULE 803 HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS 917
A reform that lands somewhere in between these two extremes may
be the cure for what ails hearsay doctrine. With all of the criticism
largely coalescing around the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions, amend-
ment efforts should focus on the Rule 803 exceptions as a class.
Expanding the trustworthiness exception that currently exists
within the business records and public records hearsay exceptions
to the remaining Rule 803 exceptions would not drastically disrupt
the existing, well-known hearsay regime. Nor would it accomplish
too little. By targeting the entire class of hearsay exceptions that
has drawn the most fire from judges and academics, expanded
trustworthiness in Rule 803 may indeed be “just right.”
II. JUST RIGHT: ALL WE NEED IS TRUSTWORTHINESS
The requirements of the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions are largely
based upon assumptions about the reliability of human statements
made under certain circumstances.96 For example, the Rule 803(1)
present sense impression exception presumes that a person is likely
to be accurate and unlikely to lie if she describes an event as it is
happening or immediately thereafter.97 Similarly, the excited
utterance exception assumes that a person still “under the stress of
excitement” caused by a “startling event” is unlikely to have the
capacity to lie about facts relating to that event.98 Rule 803(4)
assumes that a person is unlikely to lie about medical history or
causation that is reasonably pertinent to medical treatment when
seeking such treatment.99 Accordingly, these hearsay exceptions
have long been interpreted to mandate admission of hearsay
statements that satisfy their requirements, with no discretion for
the trial judge to exclude particular compliant hearsay based on
reliability concerns.100
96. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
97. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
98. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
99. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
100. See, e.g., United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[I]f a declaration
comes within a category defined as an exception, the declaration is admissible without any
preliminary finding of probable credibility by the judge, save for the ‘catch-all’ exceptions of
Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) and the business records exception of Rule 803(6).”). 
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Criticism of this categorical approach to hearsay is long stand-
ing.101 Prior to the enactment of the Rules, critics complained that
preordained hearsay categories could never accurately capture
reliable human communications.102 Professor Charles McCormick
famously questioned a “categorical” approach to hearsay: “[T]he
values of hearsay declarations or writings, and the need for them,
in particular situations cannot with any degree of realism be thus
minutely ticketed in advance.... Too much worthless evidence will
fit the categories, too much that is vitally needed will be left out.”103
Of course, Rule 807 responds to the concern that categorical
exceptions may overlook reliable hearsay needed to resolve a case.
Pursuant to the Rule 807 residual exception, trial judges have the
discretion to admit hearsay that does not fit within the preordained
categories so long as it enjoys equivalent “guarantees of trustworthi-
ness.”104 But concerns about “worthless evidence” fitting within the
categories of admissible hearsay have never been addressed within
the Rules.105 This concern animates most of the recent attacks on
the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions. Judge Posner has suggested that
the present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions
101. See, e.g., Milich, supra note 26, at 774-78; Sklansky, supra note 73, at 1 (opining that
lawyers sometimes develop a “fondness for the oddities of hearsay law, but [that] it is the kind
of affection a volunteer docent might develop for the creaky, labyrinthine corridors of an
ancient mansion, haphazardly expanded over the centuries”).
102. See Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 337 (1961)
(“Wigmore’s rationale ... makes admissible a class of hearsay rather than particular hearsay
for which, in the circumstances of the case, there is need and assurance of reliability.” (em-
phasis added)).
103. Charles T. McCormick, Tomorrow’s Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A. J. 507, 512 (1938)
(advocating a discretionary approach to hearsay evidence and criticizing “sharp categories”
of hearsay exceptions as “strange”).
104. See FED. R. EVID. 807.
105. See Edmund M. Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 1, 38-47 (AM. LAW
INST. 1942) (describing how much probative evidence the hearsay rule excludes and how much
unreliable evidence of low probative value the categorical hearsay exceptions permit); Richard
D. Friedman, Truth and Its Rivals in the Law of Hearsay and Confrontation, 49 HASTINGS L.J.
545, 552 (1998) (“I think few lawyers are satisfied with the cracker-barrel psychology that
underlies exceptions like the one for excited utterances.”); Weinstein, supra note 102, at 339
(“[A] series of independent letters written by disinterested ministers who were eyewitnesses
to an event and who are shown to have acute vision, sound memories, and clear powers of
communication might well be given more weight than many dying declarations or implied
admissions which may be made by a party having no knowledge of the event or may have been
made many years before by a predecessor in interest who had every motive to lie.” (footnotes
omitted)).
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represent nothing more than baseless “folk psychology” and laments
a judge’s obligation to admit them.106 Professor Sevier called for the
abolition of the “dubious” Rule 803 exceptions.107 Professor Bellin
has provocatively opined that Twitter is a present sense impression
engine capable of creating and preserving thousands of unreliable
but admissible hearsay statements.108 Professor Williams has
highlighted the risk of excited utterances made by fabricating or
impaired declarants.109
Any amendments to the hearsay regime should, therefore, be
targeted. They should deal directly with the familiar refrain about
the potential unreliability of hearsay admitted through the Rule 803
exceptions. Just as Rule 807 addresses the potential underin-
clusiveness of the categorical hearsay exceptions, a particularized
trustworthiness exception should be added to additional Rule 803
exceptions to deal with circumstances in which those exceptions are
overinclusive and may pave the way for the admission of unreliable
hearsay. The familiar “trustworthiness exception” currently em-
bodied in the business and the public records hearsay exceptions110
is a ready-made vehicle for curing what ails the Rule 803 exceptions.
A. The History of the Trustworthiness Exception
Rules 803(6), (7), and (8) all include a “trustworthiness exception”
to the admissibility of the hearsay statements that they describe.111
For example, the business records exception in Rule 803(6) provides
that records of regularly conducted business activities that are
routinely made at or near the time of events they record, from
information provided by someone with personal knowledge, are
admissible for their truth.112 Business records satisfying the basic
requirements of the exception are admissible, so long as “the
opponent does not show that the source of information or the
106. United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 799-802 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concurring). 
107. See Sevier, supra note 2, at 662.
108. See Bellin, Facebook, supra note 1, at 335.
109. See Williams, supra note 4, at 734-45. 
110. See Fed. R. EVID. 803(6), (8).
111. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(E), (7)(C), (8)(B).
112. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6). The exception demands that all of its threshold requirements
be shown by the testimony of a qualified witness or through a certification. Id.
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method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustwor-
thiness.”113 Therefore, the opponent of a business record has an
opportunity to challenge the inherent trustworthiness of the record
and to exclude it on that basis. The absence of business records and
the public records exceptions contain similar provisos.114
As described in my previous work, the trustworthiness exception
in Rule 803(6) was born of the United States Supreme Court’s
opinion in Palmer v. Hoffman.115 In that case, decided decades prior
to the enactment of the Rules, the Court upheld the exclusion of an
accident report made by a deceased train engineer.116 The Court
reasoned that admitting “employees’ versions of their accidents” as
records made in the regular course of business would constitute “a
real perversion of a rule designed to facilitate admission of records
which experience has shown to be quite trustworthy.”117 In crafting
the business records exception for the Rules, the Advisory Commit-
tee noted that the record in Palmer was excluded primarily due to
the railroad engineer’s incentives to falsify his account of the
accident.118 Because it is impossible to define in advance specific
business records that will be free of motivational defects in all cases,
the Advisory Committee elected to draft an exception that would
admit all records routinely made in the course of a regularly
conducted activity “subject to authority to exclude if ‘the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthi-
ness.’”119
113. FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(E).
114. See FED. R. EVID. 803(7)(C), (8)(B).
115. 318 U.S. 109, 113 (1943); see Richter, supra note 11, at 1476-78; see also Ariens, supra
note 73 (detailing the controversial history of the Supreme Court’s decision in Palmer that
characterized the common law meaning of the term “regular course of business” as precluding
admission of a record tainted by bias or improper motivation).
116. See Palmer, 318 U.S. at 111.
117. Id. at 113.
118. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules (“While the
[Palmer] opinion mentions the motivation of the engineer only obliquely, the emphasis on
records of routine operations is significant only by virtue of impact on motivation to be
accurate.”).
119. Id. (“The formulation of specific terms which would assure satisfactory results in all
cases is not possible.”); see also Ariens, supra note 73, at 226 (“[T]he Advisory Committee’s
inclusion in Rule 803(6) of the ‘trustworthiness’ guarantee element accepted Frank’s view that
the jury could not be trusted to assess evidence in which there was some motive to falsify.”).
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Thus, the trustworthiness exception to the business records
exception reflects a pragmatic view of business records. Rule 803(6)
depends upon the assumption that the vast majority of records
routinely made in the regular course of business are reliable due to
the strong business incentives to document accurately.120 Still, the
Rule acknowledges the reality that some records with all of the
requisite attributes may nonetheless lack reliability due to motiva-
tional problems or other suspicious factual circumstances.121 In
drafting the Rules, therefore, the Advisory Committee employed the
trustworthiness exception in the context in which the Supreme
Court recognized it and included it as part of the hearsay exceptions
governing both business and public records. In 2014, the business
and public records exceptions were “amended to clarify that if the
proponent has established the stated requirements of the excep-
tion[s,] ... then the burden is on the opponent to show that the
source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate a lack of trustworthiness.”122
B. The Operation of the Trustworthiness Exception
Federal courts have proved equal to the task of regulating
trustworthiness under the business and public records exceptions.
Courts have recognized that records satisfying all of the require-
ments of the business and public records exceptions are presump-
tively admissible.123 Both before and after the 2014 amendments to
Rules 803(6) and (8), courts have called upon the opponents of
hearsay evidence satisfying the business and public records excep-
tions to point to circumstances demonstrating a lack of trustworthi-
ness.124 In assessing the trustworthiness of public records, courts
120. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
121. Id.
122. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendments. Although many
courts previously placed the “burden on the opponent [with respect to the trustworthiness
exception], some ha[d] not.” Id.
123. See, e.g., Ellis v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 300 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting that
admissibility is “assumed” if a record meets the requirements of the hearsay exception).
124. See, e.g., id. at 300-01; see also FED. R. EVID. 803(6), (8) advisory committee’s notes to
2014 amendments (noting that “[t]he opponent ... is not necessarily required to introduce
affirmative evidence of untrustworthiness,” but may point more generally to circumstances
undermining reliability).
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have utilized four factors suggested by the Advisory Committee
notes: “(1) the timeliness of the investigation; (2) the special skill or
experience of the official; (3) whether a hearing was held and the
level at which conducted; [and] (4) possible motivation prob-
lems”125—although not all of these factors are relevant in every case.
Federal courts have carefully analyzed litigants’ challenges to
both business and public records and have admitted those records
in the absence of specific circumstances revealing a lack of trustwor-
thiness. In Dortch v. Fowler, for example, the Sixth Circuit rejected
the plaintiff ’s challenge to the admission of a police report pursuant
to Rule 803(8).126 The plaintiff in Dortch was gravely injured in a
head-on collision with a tractor-trailer.127 At issue in the case was
whether the collision occurred in the plaintiff ’s lane.128 At trial, the
defendant sought to introduce a police report, authored by an officer
who arrived on the accident scene within thirty-five minutes of the
collision, through Rule 803(8).129 The report concluded that the
accident occurred in the defendant truck driver’s lane, thus signal-
ing the plaintiff ’s negligence in causing the accident.130
Although the report satisfied the threshold requirements of the
public records exception to the hearsay rule, the plaintiff claimed
that it lacked trustworthiness for several reasons. First, the plaintiff
claimed—and the defendant acknowledged—that the officer had not
performed a full accident reconstruction at the scene before arriving
at the conclusions in the report.131 In addition, the plaintiff claimed
that the officer obtained and relied upon statements at the scene by
the defendant in reaching the conclusions in the report, but was
unable to speak with the plaintiff due to her debilitating injuries.132
Furthermore, the plaintiff argued that the conclusion in the report
125. FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules (citing Palmer
v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); Franklin v. Skelly Oil Co., 141 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1944);
Charles T. McCormick, Can the Courts Make Wider Use of Reports of Official Investigations?,
42 IOWA L. REV. 363 (1957)) (“Other [factors] no doubt could be added.”).
126. 588 F.3d 396, 405 (6th Cir. 2009). Although she did not author the opinion, retired
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor sat by designation with the panel. Id. at 397.
127. See id. at 398.
128. See id. at 398, 400.
129. See id. at 398, 402.
130. Id. at 398.
131. Id. at 403.
132. Id. at 402.
2018] GOLDILOCKS AND THE RULE 803 HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS 923
was contradicted by testimony given by the officer both in a
deposition and at trial concerning the location of a tire mark from
the defendant’s vehicle.133
In affirming the trial court’s ruling admitting the report, the
Sixth Circuit noted that the trial judge had analyzed the trustwor-
thiness factors listed in the advisory committee notes to Rule
803(8).134 The Sixth Circuit found that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the accident report when: (1) the
officer had extensive experience in investigating accident scenes; (2)
the officer arrived on the scene and performed an evaluation of the
scene within thirty-five minutes of the accident; (3) the report did
not include any statements made by the defendant driver; (4) the
officer testified that the conclusions in the report were based
primarily upon his own observations; and (5) the officer had no
motivational problems that could have impacted his conclusions.135
With respect to the plaintiff ’s concern about portions of the report
potentially conflicting with the officer’s deposition and trial
testimony, the Sixth Circuit noted that the plaintiff had ample
opportunity to cross-examine that conflicting testimony.136 There-
fore, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not err in
admitting the police report over the plaintiff ’s trustworthiness
objection.137
In Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., a husband sued Playtex for
the wrongful death of his wife, alleging that she died as a result of
toxic shock syndrome contracted from a Playtex tampon.138 At trial,
the district court refused to allow the plaintiff to admit a toxic shock
syndrome study produced by the Center for Disease Control (CDC)
under Rule 803(8), citing a lack of trustworthiness.139 The CDC
study contained epidemiological data concerning the connection
between tampon use and toxic shock syndrome and was based on
133. Id. at 403.
134. Id. at 402-03 (citing Miller v. Field, 35 F.3d 1088, 1090-91 (6th Cir. 1994); Baker v.
Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 558-59 (6th Cir. 1978); FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory
committee’s notes).
135. Id. at 403-04.
136. Id. at 403.
137. Id. at 404, 406.
138. 745 F.2d 292, 296 (4th Cir. 1984).
139. Id. at 297.
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doctor interviews with patients who suffered from toxic shock
syndrome.140 Following a jury verdict for the defense, the plaintiff
appealed the exclusion of the CDC study, and the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed.141 In so doing, the Fourth Circuit noted
that “‘[a]dmissibility in the first instance’ is assumed [for public
records] because of the reliability of the public agencies usually
conducting the investigation, and ‘their lack of any motive for
conducting the studies other than to inform the public fairly and
adequately.’”142 Consistent with the recent amendment to Rules
803(6) and (8), the Fourth Circuit also found that “the burden is on
the party opposing admission to demonstrate that the report is not
reliable.”143 According to the Fourth Circuit, such a public report
should be excluded only when “sufficient negative factors” demon-
strate a lack of trustworthiness.144
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the CDC study was presump-
tively admissible pursuant to the threshold requirements of Rule
803(8) because the CDC was a branch of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, which conducted the study “pursuant
to authority granted by law,” and because the study itself reflected
the “factual findings” of the CDC.145 The court then explored the
defendant’s challenge to the trustworthiness of the study. Specifi-
cally, the defense argued that the CDC study “constituted unpub-
lished ‘preliminary epidemiological data’ and not ‘final findings of
fact.’”146 The defense also argued that the CDC investigators
conducting the study lacked “firsthand knowledge of the inter-
viewee’s symptoms,” further undermining the trustworthiness of the
study.147 In addition, the defense emphasized that some of the
interviews were conducted months after the occurrence of patients’
toxic shock symptoms, and that interviewee patients were biased as
a result of their motivation to litigate claims against tampon
140. Id. at 299-300.
141. Id. at 296.
142. Id. at 300 (quoting Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble, 724 F.2d 613, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1983)).
143. Id. at 301 (citing Kehm, 724 F.2d at 618; Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551,
558 (6th Cir. 1978)).
144. See id. at 300 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C) advisory committee’s notes).
145. See id. at 301 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(8)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 302.
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manufacturers.148 Finally, the defense criticized the CDC study for
failing to identify the formal procedures or methodologies pursued
for gathering data from patients.149
The Fourth Circuit rejected each of the defense’s challenges to
trustworthiness, noting that the CDC is “highly skilled in the study
of epidemiology,”150 that the CDC had “no conceivable motive for
carrying out the studies in any other manner than to inform the
public fairly and accurately,”151 that the CDC study was eventually
published and was not preliminary (although publication is not a
necessary condition of trustworthiness),152 that “allegations of [pa-
tient] bias [we]re purely speculative,”153 and that “patient[s] afflicted
with a serious disease ... ha[ve] a strong incentive to speak candidly
with ... doctor[s].”154 In sum, the court emphasized that the burden
was on the defense to demonstrate methodological flaws in the CDC
study that would justify exclusion and that the defense had failed
to satisfy this burden.155 Because the CDC study was central to the
plaintiff ’s proof of causation, the court found that the district court’s
error in excluding the CDC study was not harmless and reversed for
a new trial.156
Federal courts similarly have rejected litigants’ attempts to un-
dermine the trustworthiness of business records admissible through
Rule 803(6). In United States v. McGill, a defendant appealed his
conviction of income tax evasion based in part on the admission of
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 301.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 302.
153. Id. at 303.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 302-03.
156. Id. at 296; see also In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 268-69
(3d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (holding that the district court abused its discretion when it
concluded that government investigatory report’s factual findings were untrustworthy); In re
Bear Stearns Cos., Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., No. 08 MDL 1963 (RWS), 2016 WL
4098385, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2016) (overruling trustworthiness objections to report by
SEC Office of the Inspector General offered pursuant to Rule 803(8)(b)); In re Ethylene
Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litig., 681 F. Supp. 2d 141, 159-60 (D. Conn.
2009) (denying defendant’s motion to strike “European Commission Statement of Objections”
and finding the document sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted through Rule 803(8)). 
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bank business records he argued lacked trustworthiness.157 In that
case, the prosecution admitted deposit tickets filled out by bank
employees upon receipt of interest income coupons from deposit-
ors.158 The prosecution produced a foundation witness establishing
the routine practice of bank employees in transcribing taxpayer
identification information from deposit envelopes received from
depositors onto deposit tickets.159 The defendant argued that the
deposit tickets lacked trustworthiness because some of the tickets
omitted the required taxpayer identification information.160 The
First Circuit rejected the defendant’s trustworthiness objection and
affirmed the district court’s admission of the deposit tickets, finding
that errors or deviations in practice are inadequate to demonstrate
lack of trustworthiness.161
In United States v. Reyes, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected a defendant’s trustworthiness challenge to a prison logbook
admitted at his trial as a business record pursuant to Rule 803(6).162
The defendant was accused of running a drug organization from
prison and ordering a cooperating prosecution witness to commit
murders on his behalf.163 The prosecution introduced the prison
logbooks through the business records exception to prove that their
cooperating witness did visit the defendant in prison and on dates
close in time to the murders.164 The defendant objected to the
admission of the logbooks, arguing that they failed to satisfy the
threshold requirements of the business records exception and,
alternatively, that the logbooks should be excluded due to a lack of
trustworthiness.165 Specifically, the defendant argued that the
logbooks were not trustworthy because they “reflect[ed] irregulari-
ties, such as missing names, missing addresses, different names in
the same handwriting, etc.” and because “prison visitors, who must
157. 953 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1992). 
158. Id. at 13-14.
159. Id. at 14.
160. Id. at 15.
161. Id. (“The mere fact that errors or deviations have occurred from time to time does not
destroy the inference of underlying trustworthiness which a judge may choose to draw from
proof of a general practice.”).
162. 157 F.3d 949, 953 (2d Cir. 1998).
163. Id. at 950.
164. Id. at 951.
165. Id. at 951, 953.
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realize that the logbook is or can be used to monitor contacts with
inmates, have an incentive to provide misinformation.”166 The
Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit the log-
books based upon testimony by the prison officials describing
processes followed to verify the information in the logbooks.167
Therefore, federal courts have evaluated challenges to trustworthi-
ness thoughtfully and have admitted business and public records
over such objections in the absence of demonstrable shortcomings in
trustworthiness.
Federal courts have required specific indicators of unreliability
before excluding business and public records that otherwise satisfy
the requirements for admissibility. In City of New York v. Pullman,
Inc., the City of New York sued suppliers of subway cars to the
City.168 At trial, the defendants sought to introduce a report
prepared by the staff of the Urban Mass Transit Administration
pursuant to Rule 803(8) regarding methods for correcting safety
problems in an effort to prove that the City failed to mitigate
damages.169 The district court excluded the report as untrustworthy
and the defendants appealed following a $72 million verdict for the
City.170 On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in excluding the report.171 The appellate
court emphasized that “the ... report was not the final report or
finding of a government agency,” but instead represented “the
tentative results of an incomplete staff investigation.”172 Further,
the court noted that the report “w[as] not based on independent
testing by the UMTA,” or even upon testing verified by the UMTA,
but was derived instead from data and information supplied by the
166. Id. at 953.
167. Id.; see also United States v. Bonomolo, No. 13-386-cr, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 9195,
at *6 (2d Cir. May 19, 2014) (finding spreadsheets trustworthy for purposes of Rule 803(6));
Wheeler v. Sims, 951 F.2d 796, 802-03 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting plaintiff ’s effort to exclude
prison records regarding his medical status offered pursuant to Rule 803(6) on the grounds
that they were made in anticipation of litigation and untrustworthy (1) when there was no
evidence that the prison expected the plaintiff to sue, and (2) when the only demonstrated
motivation of the prison medical director in making the report was to “fulfill[ ] ... his medical
responsibilities”). 
168. 662 F.2d 910, 912 (2d Cir. 1981).
169. See id. at 913-14.
170. See id. at 912.
171. Id. at 914-15.
172. Id.
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defendants themselves after the safety concerns with the subway
car arose.173 These factors were therefore sufficient to justify the
trial court’s exclusion of the report as untrustworthy.174
In Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., the plaintiff sued the
manufacturer of a plane for wrongful death following a plane
crash.175 At issue in the case was whether the crash resulted from
pilot disorientation and error or from the dangerous buildup of ice
on the plane’s stabilizing elevator.176 The trial court excluded
multiple items of evidence proffered by the plaintiff pursuant to
Rule 803(8) due to a lack of trustworthiness.177 At trial, the court
permitted the plaintiff to admit an incident report of a United
States Forestry Service pilot pursuant to Rule 803(8), but required
redaction of a statement in the report describing “considerable ice
packed in the gap between the elevator and the horizontal stabi-
lizer” due to a lack of trustworthiness.178 In addition, the trial court
excluded a United States Forestry Service Bulletin describing
dangers of flying the relevant aircraft in icing conditions due to a
lack of trustworthiness.179 Finally, the trial judge excluded a Bureau
of Flight Standards Release issued by the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) as untrustworthy.180 After a jury verdict in favor of
the defendant manufacturer, the plaintiff appealed, arguing that all
three exclusionary rulings were erroneous.181
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld all three findings of
untrustworthiness.182 With respect to the pilot’s report, the court
noted that he had not included the description of ice packing in his
incident report and was not sure who did.183 Based upon the uncer-
tain authorship of the statement, the appellate court found that the
trial judge was justified in redacting the statement pursuant to the
173. See id. at 915.
174. Id. at 914-15.
175. 847 F.2d 1261, 1263 (7th Cir. 1988).
176. Id. at 1265-66.
177. Id. at 1272-75.
178. Id. at 1271-73.
179. Id. at 1273-74.
180. Id. at 1274-75.
181. Id. at 1263.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1272-73.
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trustworthiness limitation in Rule 803(8).184 With respect to the
United States Forestry Service Bulletin, the court noted the
complete lack of information regarding the author of the bulletin,
his qualifications, the procedures followed in releasing the bulletin,
and its accuracy.185 Accordingly, the court found no error in the
exclusion of the bulletin.186 With respect to the FAA Bureau of
Flight Standards Release, the appellate court noted the trial judge’s
finding that the release had been cancelled by the FAA almost ten
years prior to the manufacture of the plane at issue in the case.187
For this reason, the appellate court found that the trial judge did
not abuse his discretion in excluding the release for a lack of
trustworthiness.188
Federal courts have also excluded documents proffered as
business records pursuant to Rule 803(6) due to a demonstrated
lack of trustworthiness. In particular, when opponents of business
records have demonstrated a litigation motive for their preparation,
courts have routinely excluded them.189
Therefore, courts presume the reliability and admissibility of
records satisfying the threshold requirements of the business and
the public records exceptions and look to the opponent of such
hearsay to point to specific circumstances undermining that pre-
sumed reliability. Courts frequently reject trustworthiness chal-
lenges to business and public records and exclude evidence under
this exception only when circumstances surrounding the records
184. Id. at 1273.
185. Id. at 1274.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1275.
188. Id.; see also Palmer v. Lampson Int’l, LLC, No. 11-CV-199-J, 2012 WL 10918920, at
*1 (D. Wyo. Nov. 28, 2012) (excluding a Mine Safety and Health Administration Report and
Citation because circumstances indicated a lack of trustworthiness). 
189. See, e.g., Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2013) (excluding an adjuster’s
report when plaintiffs “carried their burden of showing that [it] was an untrustworthy
document prepared in anticipation of litigation”); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London
v. Sinkovich, 232 F.3d 200, 205 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Litigants cannot evade the trustworthiness
requirement of Rule 803(6) by simply hiring an outside party to investigate an accident and
then arguing that the report is a business record because the investigator regularly prepares
such reports as part of his business. If that were the case, parties that face litigious situations
could always hire such nonaffiliated firms and investigators to prepare a report and then seek
to admit the document over hearsay objection.”).
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demonstrate a lack of trustworthiness.190 Obvious motives to
misrepresent or serious mistakes in the preparation of the records
are necessary to justify exclusion of otherwise admissible records.191
C. Trustworthiness Expansion: A Superior Alternative
The familiar trustworthiness exception within the business and
the public records exceptions, with which federal judges and
litigants have substantial experience, should be expanded to
additional hearsay exceptions in Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Some of the most heated recent criticisms of hearsay
doctrine have targeted the hearsay exceptions in Rule 803, most
notably the present sense impression exception and the excited
utterance exception.192 Several of these attacks have questioned the
uniform reliability of hearsay statements falling within these excep-
tions, suggesting that some unreliable hearsay could potentially
satisfy all of the requirements for admissibility under these excep-
tions.193 Rather than discarding all categorical hearsay exceptions
or even the “dubious [Rule 803] exceptions,”194 the trustworthiness
exception or escape clause currently embodied in the business and
the public records exceptions could be applied with precision to
exclude only those hearsay statements with a demonstrated and
particularized lack of trustworthiness.
1. Rule 803: The Weak Link in the Chain
Proposed hearsay amendments that upend the entire hearsay
regime are overbroad in attacking well-established elements of the
hearsay scheme that are currently functioning well.195 Rather than
tilting at windmills, a proposal that is “just right” would repair only
190. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, § 8:83 (describing rare circumstances
leading to the exclusion of business records based on the trustworthiness exception). 
191. See id. § 8:92 (“Raising mere possibilities of untrustworthiness, without convincing
proof or argument making such risks palpable and clear, are not enough to require exclusion
of evidence that fits the exception.”).
192. See supra Part I.A.
193. See, e.g., United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 800 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concur-
ring).
194. See Sevier, supra note 2, at 662.
195. See supra Part I.B.
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the portions of hearsay doctrine that are arguably broken to some
extent.196 For all the hue and cry over the hearsay rule and its
exceptions generally, much of the criticism ends up at the doorstep
of Rule 803. Judge Posner’s recent call to eliminate all of the
categorical hearsay exceptions originated with a rant over the
irrationality of the present sense impression and excited utterance
exceptions found in Rule 803.197 One of the most concrete reform
proposals in Professor Sevier’s recent advocacy of a “procedural
justice” model of hearsay is the repeal of the “dubious [Rule 803]
exceptions.”198 Indeed, the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions have con-
sistently drawn the most fire and present long-standing reliability
concerns that remain unaddressed.199 Categorical hearsay excep-
tions in other rules are either not premised upon reliability at all,
include necessity justifications beyond reliability, or have been
amended and improved to correct perceived inadequacies. For this
reason, proposals that would alter the entire hearsay regime and all
five categories of hearsay exceptions within it threaten to under-
mine hearsay doctrine that is functioning well in the vast majority
of cases. Rather than throwing all of hearsay doctrine into disarray
with a true paradigm shift, amendments to the hearsay regime
should provide a repair at the true point of weakness—Rule 803.
Rule 801(d)(1) provides hearsay exceptions or exemptions
covering prior hearsay statements made by declarants who testify
as witnesses at trial.200 The three exceptions in this category are
working well, and any concerns regarding their operation have been,
and are being, addressed through proposals narrowly tailored to
those concerns. Indeed, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules
has carefully reviewed these exceptions in order to propose amend-
ments needed to correct any flaws unique to the operation of these
provisions. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) was amended in 2014 to resolve the
196. See Gold, supra note 89, at 1619 (stating that the first commandment of amending the
Rules is, “If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It”). 
197. See Boyce, 742 F.3d at 800.
198. Sevier, supra note 2, at 662.
199. See James Donald Moorehead, Compromising the Hearsay Rule: The Fallacy of Res
Gestae Reliability, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 203 (1995) (recommending abolition of all res gestae
hearsay exceptions due to insufficient reliability).
200. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) (requiring that “[t]he declarant testif[y] and [be] subject to
cross-examination about a prior statement”).
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mysteriously underinclusive nature of the original provision that
permitted substantive admissibility of some prior consistent state-
ments made by testifying witnesses, but not other similarly situated
prior consistencies.201 In 2015, the Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules began considering modifications to Rule 801(d)(1)(A) govern-
ing substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements in
light of the favorable experience of some states with broader
hearsay exceptions for those witness statements.202 Furthermore,
the Rule 801(d)(1) provisions do not rest solely on problematic
considerations of reliability decried by recent hearsay critics, but are
supported by the presence of in-court cross-examination of the
declarant-witness at the trial or hearing in which the hearsay is
offered.203 Thus, the rationality and procedural justice criticisms of
the hearsay rule are largely inapplicable in this context, and any
flaws in these provisions are being addressed with targeted
amendments.
The various statements of party opponents admissible through
Rule 801(d)(2) are not premised at all on assumptions about
reliability that have drawn recent criticism. Rather, the hearsay of
a party opponent is admissible due to notions of adversarial fairness
that require a litigant to be answerable for the statements she
makes or for those made by agents, employees, or co-conspirators
with whom she associates.204 Indeed, the requirement that a
declarant possess personal knowledge of the information relayed in
a statement—critical for reliability—is not required for hearsay
statements admissible through the Rule 801(d)(2) exceptions.205
Thus, criticisms of the hearsay rules for relying at all on notions of
reliability or of the particular assumptions about reliability they
reflect are inapplicable to the Rule 801(d)(2) exceptions. Therefore,
201. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (permitting substantive admissibility of prior consistent
statements offered to rehabilitate a declarant-witness “when attacked on another ground”);
id. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendments. See generally Richter, supra
note 55. 
202. See Capra Memorandum on Possible Amendment, 2016, supra note 8, at 1, 7-11.
203. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) (requiring that the declarant testify at trial subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement).
204. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
205. 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, § 8:44 (“Such an admission is not ...
excludable merely because the speaker lacks personal knowledge.”).
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none of the recent concerns regarding the existing hearsay regime
justifies any alteration of the hearsay provisions in Rule 801(d)(2).
Nor is there any pressing need to amend or eliminate the Rule
804 hearsay exceptions due to concerns over questionable reliability.
First and foremost, these hearsay exceptions depend on strong
considerations of necessity, as well as assumptions about reliability,
because all of the Rule 804 exceptions require the demonstrated
unavailability of the declarant.206 Therefore, the hearsay statements
within this Rule are disfavored and admitted only when live trial
testimony cannot be had.
Furthermore, the reliability critiques that have been launched
against the Rule 803 exceptions207 have less relevance in the Rule
804 context. The former testimony exception in Rule 804(b)(1) is a
time-honored hearsay exception that affords the opponent a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant208 that has been
deemed constitutionally adequate, even when used against a
criminal defendant.209 The procedural protection for the opponent
provided by prior cross-examination underscores this exception—not
notions about the inherent reliability of the previous statements.
The forfeiture by wrongdoing exception in Rule 804(b)(6) likewise
makes no assumptions about the reliability of the hearsay that it
admits. It is the intentional misconduct of the opponent of the
hearsay evidence in making the declarant unavailable that justifies
the admission of this hearsay—reliable or not.210 Hearsay admitted
through the narrow exception for statements of personal or family
history in Rule 804(b)(4) has never been questioned, particularly in
light of the unavailability requirement.211
206. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (“The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.”).
207. See supra Part I.A.
208. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1)(B) (allowing admission of former testimony if the party against
whom it is offered had “an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or
redirect examination”).
209. See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (holding that the Confronta-
tion Clause requires opportunity for cross-examination of testimonial hearsay before trial, in
the case of an absent and unavailable declarant).
210. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (allowing hearsay of an unavailable declarant to be admitted
against a party only if that party wrongfully and intentionally caused or acquiesced in causing
the declarant’s unavailability).
211. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(4); 5 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, § 8:133.
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The declarations against interest exception in Rule 804(b)(3) does
depend on the inherent reliability of hearsay statements that are so
contrary to the interests of the declarant that no reasonable person
would make such statements unless they were true.212 Although an
exception grounded in assumptions about human motivations and
reliability could potentially draw criticism similar to that leveled at
the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions, concerns about Rule 804(b)(3) have
already been significantly addressed through both case law and
rules amendments. In Williamson v. United States, the Supreme
Court interpreted the declarations against interest exception
narrowly to require that all parts of a hearsay statement admitted
through the exception be against the speaker’s own interest at the
time of its making.213 This interpretation prevents the admission of
collateral statements of questionable reliability that may not dis-
serve the declarant.214 The use of the declarations against interest
exception in criminal cases has long been cause for concern, leading
to a requirement in the original rule that a criminal defendant show
corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate the trustworthi-
ness of a statement against penal interest offered to exculpate the
accused.215 Concerns over the uneven and unfair application of this
provision to criminal defendants only led to a 2010 amendment
expanding the corroborating circumstances requirement to the
prosecution in criminal cases as well.216 Thus, the declarations
against interest exception is limited to circumstances where the de-
clarant is unavailable to provide live testimony, has been narrowly
construed to apply only to statements that are themselves against
the speaker’s interest, and requires corroborating circumstances in
212. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(A) (allowing “[a] statement that ... a reasonable person in the
declarant’s position would have made only if the person believed it to be true because, when
made, it was so contrary to the declarant’s ... interest”). 
213. 512 U.S. 594, 599-600 (1994). 
214. See id.
215. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules (explain-
ing need for corroboration when an accused seeks to admit third party declarations against
interest to exculpate the accused). 
216. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(B) (now requiring corroboration for all declarations against
interest offered by either the prosecution or defense in a criminal case if those statements
tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability); id. 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to
2010 amendments (“Rule 804(b)(3) has been amended to provide that the corroborating
circumstances requirement applies to all declarations against penal interest offered in
criminal cases.”).
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the criminal context.217 Any dangers posed by this exception have
been addressed through Supreme Court and Advisory Committee
oversight.
Last, but hardly least, is the dying declarations exception in Rule
804(b)(2), which allows statements made by a declarant about the
cause and circumstances of his death “while believing [that his]
death [is] imminent.”218 This Rule 804 exception assumes that a
dying individual is unlikely to misrepresent, intentionally or
otherwise, the cause and circumstances leading to his demise as he
departs the world.219 This exception, of course, could be argued to
suffer from the same questionable assumptions about the reliability
of human communications that plague the Rule 803 exceptions. Just
as skeptics question whether excitement and stress lead to reliabil-
ity for purposes of the excited utterance exception,220 they could
similarly question whether a dying person can be trusted to speak
reliably about the cause and circumstances of his or her impending
death. As our society becomes increasingly secular, some of the
religious overtones of the common law exception disappear.221 Like
the Rule 803 exceptions, the dying declarations exception is cabined
by limitations, requiring a finding that the declarant had a settled
hopeless expectation of imminent death at the time of the state-
ment, allowing only statements about the cause or circumstances of
that impending death, and limiting the use of the exception in
criminal cases to homicide prosecutions, where they are most likely
needed.222
The most important distinction between the dying declarations
exception and Rule 803 exceptions like the excited utterance
217. Of course, the Sixth Amendment applies another layer of protection for criminal
defendants in the unlikely event that a testimonial hearsay statement could be found “against
interest” and admissible against a criminal defendant. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory
committee’s note to 1974 enactment.
218. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (allowing “a statement that the declarant ... ma[kes] about
[the] cause or circumstances” of his death “while believing ... death to be imminent” “[i]n a
prosecution for homicide or in a civil case”).
219. See 5 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, § 8:124. 
220. See, e.g., United States v. Boyce, 742 F.2d 792, 801-02 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
221. See 5 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, § 8:124 (discussing contemporary chal-
lenges to the rationale for dying declarations exception).
222. FED R. EVID. 804(b)(2); id. 804(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1974 enactment.
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exception, however, is that the former resides in Rule 804. In
addition to all of the limitations on the types of statements admissi-
ble through the exception, this provision operates only to admit the
hearsay of unavailable, usually deceased, declarants.223 The excep-
tion is therefore invoked less often than the Rule 803 exceptions and
only in cases of greatest need.224 The exception is already so limited
that the only potential reform to address reliability concerns might
be the elimination of the exception altogether. Efforts to repeal the
dying declarations exception would run squarely against tradi-
tion.225 Dying declarations have such a pedigree that even Justice
Antonin Scalia thought they might escape the Crawford revolu-
tion.226 In sum, therefore, there is no pressing need for hearsay
reform in connection with the Rule 804 categorical exceptions.
Nor is there a current crisis in the operation of the residual
hearsay exception in Rule 807. This exception was included by the
Advisory Committee in recognition of the impossibility of devising
categorical hearsay exceptions capable of capturing and admitting
all reliable human hearsay statements.227 Congress added limita-
tions to the Advisory Committee’s draft rule to protect against
frequent and unbridled use of the catchall exception, demanding
that the hearsay admitted through the exception have guarantees
of trustworthiness “equivalent” to the categorical exceptions, be
“offered as evidence of a material fact,” be “more probative ... than
any other evidence that the proponent can obtain,” and be admitted
only when it will serve “the interests of justice.”228 Notwithstanding
all of this restrictive language, there were early concerns about
liberal use of the exception, particularly in criminal cases.229 In
223. See 5 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, § 8:124.
224. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1974 enactment; 5 MUELLER
& KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, § 8:124.
225. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
226. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004).
227. See DANIEL J. CAPRA, ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE THAT MAY REQUIRE CLARIFICATION 48 (1998) (“It would ... be presumptuous to
assume that all possible desirable exceptions to the hearsay rule have been catalogued and
to pass the hearsay rule to oncoming generations as a closed system.”).
228. FED. R. EVID. 807; see also CAPRA, supra note 227, at 48.
229. See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Commentary, A Response to Professor Swift: The Hearsay
Rule at Work: Has It Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Discretion?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 507,
514-19 (1992) (arguing that the catchall exception to the hearsay rule has eroded the prohibi-
tion on hearsay evidence). 
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2004, Crawford v. Washington eliminated concerns of uncross-
examined testimonial hearsay being admitted through Rule 807
against criminal defendants.230 More recent research into the oper-
ation of Rule 807 in federal courts reveals sparing underuse of Rule
807 and a reluctance of federal judges to admit even highly reliable
hearsay through the exception.231 Indeed, the Advisory Committee
for the Federal Rules of Evidence is currently studying potential
tweaks to Rule 807 that would enhance its intended operation.232
Thus, perceived failings in hearsay doctrine are not focused on the
rarely utilized catchall exception in Rule 807.
It is the hearsay being admitted through the Rule 803 exceptions
and the assumptions about human behavior and motivations within
those exceptions that have caused the most significant contempo-
rary concern about the hearsay regime.233 Many of these concerns
regarding the Rule 803 exceptions have not been addressed by
modern fixes like those that have been or are being made to other
hearsay rules. Never a proponent of rushing in to correct the
functional, I recognize and accept the highly persuasive argument
that the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions should be left well enough
alone.234 Noted experts have argued that these exceptions work well
in the vast majority of cases and are essential to predictability for
trial lawyers and parties.235 Any imperfections in the reliability of
hearsay admitted through the Rule 803 exceptions may be ad-
dressed to the fact-finder as issues of weight. Still, criticism of the
Rule 803 hearsay exceptions has reached a crescendo in recent
years, and some remedial action may be inevitable.236 To the extent
that a decision is made to amend the hearsay rules to respond to
these modern criticisms of the hearsay regime, the appropriate fix
for what ails contemporary hearsay doctrine ought to be addressed
230. See 541 U.S. at 57-59.
231. See Capra Memorandum on Expanding the Residual Exception, supra note 9, at 17-22
(cataloguing Rule 807 cases and finding a restrictive approach to the residual exception). 
232. See id. at 5-8.
233. See supra Part I.A.
234. Richter, supra note 1, at 1726-27.
235. See Panel Discussion, supra note 6, at 1364-68 (remarks of Professor Stephen A.
Saltzburg describing reliability, necessity, and foundational rationales for hearsay exceptions
and advocating their retention); see also Stephen A. Saltzburg, Rethinking the Rationale(s)
for Hearsay Exceptions, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1485, 1488-89 (2016).
236. See supra Part I.A.
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to these Rule 803 exceptions, rather than to the hearsay scheme as
a whole.
2. A Silver Bullet
Once the focus shifts to Rule 803, the question becomes how best
to fix the perceived failings of the hearsay exceptions in that
category. There have been many calls over the years to reform
particular hearsay exceptions within Rule 803 through amendments
to only single hearsay exceptions.237 Reforming hearsay exceptions
one by one raises multiple concerns. First, it takes many years to
amend a federal rule, requiring long periods of public comment and
consideration by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
the Judicial Conference of the United States, and the United States
Supreme Court, followed by submission to Congress.238 Amending
problematic hearsay exceptions within Rule 803 one at a time could
take decades to achieve comprehensive reform. In addition, con-
sidering amendments to a single hearsay exception can produce
amendments that have collateral consequences for other exceptions
that remain inadequately explored in light of the narrow scope of
the amendment.239 Although the Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules exercises its substantial peripheral vision in considering any
amendment, amending exceptions one at a time increases the risk
that newly added language or requirements could have implications
for other unexamined rules.240 To address deficiencies in each
increases the likelihood of fixing one problem only to generate new
interpretive problems in other exceptions due to the relationship
among individual exceptions. Finally, individual amendments that
add new requirements specific to each exception within Rule 803
add to the complexity of the hearsay regime that has drawn so much
criticism.241
Expanding a trustworthiness exception to additional Rule 803
categories represents a hearsay update that is “just right” because
237. See supra Part I.A.
238. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073-2074 (2012).
239. See Gold, supra note 89, at 1622-23, 1622 n.47.
240. See id.
241. See, e.g., Richter, supra note 1, at 1706.
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it utilizes a single tool to resolve potential reliability problems
across a variety of the Rule 803 exceptions and avoids a piecemeal
approach to hearsay reform that alters exceptions one at a time. A
trustworthiness escape clause is a natural solution to alleged
imperfections in the reliability assumptions supporting the Rule 803
hearsay exceptions. Indeed, both the business and the public records
exceptions assume the trustworthiness of records regularly created
and relied upon by businesses or public agencies.242 The escape
clause in those exceptions permits an opponent of an otherwise
admissible hearsay statement to demonstrate that something about
“the source of the information [in the statement] or the method or
circumstances of [its] preparation,” undermines the general assump-
tions of reliability for a particular record.243 If the opponent can
meet its burden of demonstrating a lack of trustworthiness for the
particular statement at issue, the statement will be excluded.244
Adding a similar trustworthiness exception to other Rule 803
hearsay exceptions that embody similar generalized assumptions
about reliability could address many of the perceived flaws in the
operation of those exceptions. For example, recent criticisms of the
present sense impression exception in Rule 803(1) highlight the
possibility that potentially unreliable hearsay statements could
satisfy its requirements.245 The present sense impression exception
permits hearsay statements describing or explaining an event or
condition at the very time that the declarant perceives it or
immediately thereafter.246 Critics have suggested that the timing
requirement in the present sense impression is an imperfect
guarantor of reliability because humans are capable of lying
instantaneously and because unverifiable and potentially unreliable
social media e-hearsay—such as a tweet—could fit within the
parameters of the exception.247 An amendment that maintains the
242. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, § 8:77 (describing reliability rationale
for business records exceptions). Of course, both exceptions also rest on notions of necessity
and efficiency in avoiding time-consuming testimony by business and public agency
employees. See id.
243. FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(E), (8)(B).
244. See id.
245. See United States v. Boyce, 742 F.2d 792, 799-801 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concur-
ring).
246. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
247. See Boyce, 742 F.3d at 796 (majority opinion); Bellin, Facebook, supra note 1, at 362. 
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existing requirements of the present sense impression exception and
adds a trustworthiness escape clause could allow the exception to
continue to admit the vast majority of hearsay squarely within its
reliability rationale, while permitting opponents in certain cases to
demonstrate that particular statements are undeserving of the
presumption of reliability it affords. For example, in a case where a
declarant would have had and recognized an immediate motive to
misrepresent an event like an accident, the opponent of that
statement could demonstrate “that the source of information”248 in
the statement is not trustworthy and have it excluded.249 Assuming
that an unverified tweet could meet the admissibility requirements
of Rule 803(1) in the first place,250 the opponent of that tweet could
demonstrate that the “circumstances of preparation indicate a lack
of trustworthiness”251 and seek exclusion.
The excited utterance exception in Rule 803(2) has also been
criticized for admitting particular hearsay statements of doubtful
reliability.252 This exception admits statements made by a declarant
who is under the stress of excitement caused by a startling event
when she speaks, so long as the “statement[s] relat[e] to [that]
startling event.”253 Questions arise as to whether the stress and
excitement required by the rule eliminate the ability to misrepre-
sent, and also whether high levels of stress detract from perception,
memory, and narration in significant ways that undermine the
reliability of excited utterances.254
A trustworthiness escape clause applicable to Rule 803(2) could
assuage some of these concerns as well. In circumstances where a
particular declarant has a clear motive to fabricate, notwithstanding
248. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(E), (8)(B).
249. See, e.g., Starr v. Morsette, 236 N.W.2d 183, 186 (N.D. 1975) (noting that the driver
said moments after an accident that her passenger “grabbed the wheel, causing the pickup
to go into the ditch and overturn”).
250. It seems extremely unlikely, however, that a tweet, uncorroborated by any other
circumstances, would satisfy the timing and personal knowledge requirements of Rule 803(1).
See Richter, supra note 1, at 1689-90. 
251. See generally FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(E), (8)(B).
252. See, e.g., Boyce, 742 F.3d at 801-02 (Posner, J., concurring); see also Baicker-McKee,
supra note 4 (extensively cataloguing potential reliability shortcomings in excited utterances).
253. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
254. See id. 803(2) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules (noting that the
excited utterance exception “has been criticized on the ground that excitement impairs
accuracy of observation”); see also Baicker-McKee, supra note 4.
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a state of excitement, or where a declarant is under so much stress
as to appear incoherent, the opponent of the excited utterance could
argue for its exclusion.255 Instead of abrogating the exception in its
entirety and losing all hearsay statements within its reach, a trust-
worthiness exception would allow the excited utterance exception to
continue playing a key role in important contexts (like the domestic
violence arena) while affording opponents some opportunity to
challenge the reliability assumptions within the exception for
certain suspect statements.
The state of mind exception is another Rule 803 exception that
has raised concerns about the trustworthiness of the hearsay that
it admits. Rule 803(3) admits hearsay “statements of [a] declarant’s
[own] then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan)
or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling,
pain, or bodily health).”256 The rationale underlying the state of
mind exception is that there is no better evidence of a person’s own
mental condition than that person’s own contemporaneous descrip-
tion.257 No other witness or declarant will have information on this
subject that is superior, and trial testimony by the declarant himself
as to a former state of mind will always be inferior to statements
made at the relevant time. So, while these state of mind assertions
may not be inherently reliable, they are more reliable than other
evidence we could obtain on this point.
The problem that has arisen with Rule 803(3) relates to patently
self-serving statements. Perhaps a declarant injured in an accident
is aware of the possibility of litigation when she claims that she is
experiencing significant pain. In another example, a declarant well
aware that he may be suspected of a crime describes his then-
existing, benign intentions. Notwithstanding these clear motiva-
tional defects, these statements satisfy the straightforward require-
ments of Rule 803(3). Courts have struggled with statements like
these, but have concluded that the hearsay regime mandates
255. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 577 F.3d 660, 664 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming admis-
sion of excited utterance by teenage declarant who admitted exaggerating her statement to
encourage a prompt police response).
256. FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
257. Id. 803(3) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules (noting that Rule 803(3)
is a “specialized application” of Rule 803(1)); see also Saltzburg, supra note 235, at 1489-94
(discussing necessity rationale for exceptions like the state of mind exception).
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admissibility of hearsay statements that satisfy the categorical
exceptions.258 Under the existing categorical regime, if a statement
fits a hearsay exception, a court must admit it over a hearsay
objection.259
A trustworthiness escape would resolve the natural tension be-
tween the logical rationale for admitting these hearsay statements
as the best evidence in most circumstances and the capacity of the
exception to admit blatantly self-serving hearsay. It would free the
hands of courts and allow exclusion of particular statements that
suffer from demonstrable motivational defects. Indeed, these
situations are very reminiscent of the exclusion of business records
made in anticipation of litigation.260 Although many businesses
routinely investigate and record information related to incidents
that could give rise to liability, courts recognize the inherent moti-
vational difficulties inherent in such records.261 When a business
seeks to admit its own record prepared at a time when litigation
could have been anticipated against an opponent, opponents of the
records can utilize the trustworthiness exception to exclude the self-
serving business records.262 Rule 803(3) presents the same problem
in a different context. It follows that the same remedy can be used
to reach a more rational result for self-serving state of mind hearsay
statements.
Rule 803(4) admits hearsay statements made for the purpose of
seeking medical treatment or diagnosis and extends to all state-
ments of symptoms, medical history, or causation that are reason-
ably pertinent to such treatment or diagnosis.263 This hearsay
exception recognizes the strong motivation of patients, or loved ones
258. See, e.g., United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[I]f a declaration
comes within a category defined as an exception, the declaration is admissible without any
preliminary finding of probable credibility by the judge, save for the ‘catch-all’ exceptions of
Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) and the business records exception of Rule 803(6).”). 
259. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, § 8:71 (“[C]ourts should be at least
hesitant to exclude statements that otherwise fit [Rule 803(3)] .... The scheme of categorical
exceptions reinforces this point (satisfying express requirements is enough)—only a few, such
as the catchall and the ones for business and public records, include broad-brush references
to trustworthiness.”).
260. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
261. See id.
262. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(E).
263. FED. R. EVID. 803(4). 
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seeking treatment on their behalf, to be as accurate as possible
when relaying information pertinent to treatment or diagnosis in an
effort to obtain such treatment or diagnosis.264 A failure to relate a
symptom accurately or to explain causation honestly could lead to
harmful, improper, or ineffective care.
Although the medical context provides obvious and powerful
incentives to speak accurately, situations may arise in which
competing motivations could serve to undermine the reliability of
such statements. For example, a parent’s statements to emergency
room physicians describing a fall that injured a minor child fits
squarely within the requirements of the hearsay exception. An
abusive parent responsible for the child’s injuries would have a
powerful incentive to misrepresent facts about causation pertinent
to treatment to avoid culpability, making her description of events
highly unreliable.265 In addition, Rule 803(4) was expanded beyond
the common law hearsay exception to cover statements made for
purposes of “medical diagnosis” without any corresponding treat-
ment.266 The rationale for this expansion was to allow substantive
use of patient statements made to physicians testifying as expert
witnesses, on the assumption that such patient statements would
be revealed to the fact-finder as part of the foundation for the
expert’s testimony in any event.267 Rule 803(4), therefore, would
cover a plaintiff ’s statements about symptoms and causation to a
physician for the purpose of obtaining a “diagnosis” that might be
helpful in anticipated litigation.268 The powerful incentives to report
accurately that exist in the treatment context may not extend to a
diagnosis made in anticipation of litigation.
264. See id. 803(4) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
265. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, § 8:75 (“[S]tatements by parents to
doctor[s] ... must be treated as suspect because perpetrators are often parents or relatives
with motive for casting blame.” (citing United States v. Yazzie, 59 F.3d 807, 812-13 (9th Cir.
1995))).
266. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
267. This assumption was subsequently displaced by a 2000 amendment to Rule 703
providing that otherwise inadmissible evidence upon which an expert relies should not be
revealed to the fact-finder unless its “probative value in helping the jury evaluate the
[expert’s] opinion substantially outweighs [any] prejudicial effect.” FED. R. EVID. 703; id. 703
advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments. Of course, patient hearsay statements made
for purposes of diagnosis that fall within Rule 803(4) are admissible and not subject to the
Rule 703 limitation. 
268. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (covering statements made for “medical diagnosis”). 
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A trustworthiness exception to Rule 803(4) would preserve the
admissibility of most statements made for purposes of medical
treatment or diagnosis when patients possess a strong interest in
speaking accurately, while allowing opponents in rare circumstan-
ces such as the ones above to challenge the reliability of suspect
statements and to exclude those that appear untrustworthy. Finally,
statements assigning fault for a condition or injury to a particular
individual are typically excluded as outside Rule 803(4) because
fault is not pertinent to appropriate treatment, and declarants may
lack the incentive to accurately report that they possess with
respect to general causation or their symptoms.269 Courts have
expanded Rule 803(4) beyond its traditional reliability guarantees
to statements of fault in the context of child abuse cases, however.270
While courts evaluate some motivational factors to determine the
admissibility of statements identifying abusers made to treating
professionals through Rule 803(4) in these cases, a trustworthiness
escape could be an additional tool for identifying circumstances that
justify this expansive approach to hearsay statements of fault made
to medical professionals.271
The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules recently focused its
attention on the “ancient documents” hearsay exception in Rule
803(16).272 Since its adoption in 1975, this exception has allowed
authentic documents that are at least twenty years old to be admit-
ted for their truth.273 Emphasizing that age alone provides no
guarantee of reliability and alarmed by the vast amount of electroni-
cally stored data approaching twenty years of age, the Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules proposed abrogation of the ancient
documents exception in 2015.274 The public comment on the proposal
269. See id. 803(4) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
270. See, e.g., Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474, 477 n.2 (Wyo. 1997) (noting that “an over-
whelming majority of jurisdictions, including at least 32 states and 4 federal circuits” admit
victim statements identifying the perpetrator in child abuse cases). 
271. See Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of Medical
Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REV. 257, 281 (1989) (arguing that the rationale for the
hearsay exception does not extend to victims’ identifications of perpetrators). 
272. See Capra Memorandum on Proposal to Eliminate the Ancient Documents Exception,
supra note 56, at 6-9.
273. FED. R. EVID. 803(16). The exception has a companion authenticity provision in Fed.
R. Evid. 901(b)(8).
274. See Capra Memorandum on Proposal to Eliminate the Ancient Documents Exception,
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vehemently opposed abrogation of the exception.275 Although the
commenters failed to identify any inherent reliability in twenty-
year-old hearsay, they passionately defended their dependence on
the exception in cases involving latent diseases, toxic torts, and
church child abuse.276 The Advisory Committee modified the pro-
posal as a result, retaining the ancient documents exception for
documents created before January 1, 1998, but abolishing the
exception for all documents, including the pending onslaught of
electronically stored information created on, or after, that date.277
Therefore, notwithstanding the Advisory Committee’s expressed
concern that the age of a document alone provides no assurance of
reliability, the exception is retained for documents created before
January 1, 1998.
A trustworthiness exception applicable to Rule 803(16) could
provide some remedy for the original reliability concern that led to
the proposed abrogation, while continuing the general availability
of the exception in the cases described by the public commentary.
Opponents of ancient documents created before 1998 could point to
motivational or other circumstances suggesting that specific ancient
documents lack trustworthiness to exclude those that appear affirm-
atively unreliable. For example, public commentary opposing the
abrogation of the ancient documents exception specifically pointed
to cases of decades-old child abuse by church officials as an example
of the need for an ancient documents exception.278 Importantly, the
ancient documents exception could work against plaintiffs in cases
like these. Suppose that an accused church official kept a diary at
the time of the alleged abuse. If more than twenty years old, created
before 1998, and authentic, all statements in that diary—including
supra note 56, at 6-9 (describing the proposed abrogation); see also Daniel J. Capra, Elec-
tronically Stored Information and the Ancient Documents Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Fix
It Before People Find Out About It, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 34-41 (2015) (discussing ways to
amend Rule 803(16)). Indeed, it is not clear that there was a hearsay exception for ancient
documents prior to the Rules. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, § 8:100.
275. See Capra Memorandum on Proposal to Eliminate the Ancient Documents Exception,
supra note 56, at 9-10, 12 (describing the public comment).
276. Id. at 9-10.
277. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 57, at 3.
278. See Capra Memorandum on Proposal to Eliminate the Ancient Documents Exception,
supra note 56, at 12 (describing the public comment).
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self-serving and exculpatory explanations of encounters with
involved children—would be admissible for their truth.
Here again, a trustworthiness exception could assist plaintiffs in
excluding this evidence. If plaintiffs could demonstrate the motiva-
tional defects in this diary, they could potentially exclude this
specific, unreliable ancient document. While a trustworthiness
“exception” was not an appropriate response to the Advisory Com-
mittee’s original concern that ancient documents warrant no
presumption of inherent trustworthiness in the first place,279 the
trustworthiness escape clause could provide some modest protection
to opponents of demonstrably unreliable pre-1998 documents that
remain admissible under the modified exception. While it may be
difficult to demonstrate the untrustworthy nature of ancient
documents, and challenges to the admissibility of these documents
may rarely succeed, it would afford opponents at least some
mechanism to challenge the wholesale admission of the old under
the modified exception.
Even lesser-used Rule 803 exceptions might benefit from a
trustworthiness escape clause. Rule 803(9) admits public records of
vital statistics, including births, deaths, or marriages.280 Record-
keepers in this context must rely on representations from third
parties involved in births, marriages, or deaths.281 Although cer-
tainly deserving of a presumption of reliability given the solemnity
and ceremony attending such occasions, some unusual circum-
stances could arise which would detract from the trustworthiness of
even these hearsay statements.282 For example, with respect to a
birth certificate, there could be motivations in cases involving a
paternity dispute to misrepresent identity of parents.283 A trustwor-
thiness clause could be useful in challenging certificates resulting
from reports of declarants with clear motives to lie.
279. See id. at 1 (noting that the Committee had found that the exception “confuses authen-
ticity ... with reliability”).
280. FED. R. EVID. 803(9).
281. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, § 8:93.
282. See id.
283. See id. (“In many settings, attending physicians or midwives ... who deliver a child
should be able to rely on statements by the mother identifying the father, but arguably not
in the setting of paternity suits where motivation may be problematic at the time of birth.”).
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Rule 803(13) admits “statements of fact about personal or family
history contained in family record[s], such as Bible[s], genealog[ies],
chart[s], engraving[s] ... [and] inscription[s].”284 While certainly
deserving of a presumption of reliability, it is not difficult to imagine
circumstances calling the trustworthiness of certain inscriptions in
Bibles or engravings on rings into question. Here too, a trustworthi-
ness exception could be utilized to challenge such family records in
appropriate cases. Similarly, Rule 803(19) allows evidence of reputa-
tion on personal or family history among family members, associ-
ates, or in the community.285 Even here where information is needed
and likely reliable, “[m]istakes occur and false information circu-
lates (careless talk, rumor, even determined deception), but usually
common repute gets the matter right.”286 Although Rule 803(19) is
rarely invoked,287 a trustworthiness exception could aid potential
reliability issues in this area.
Therefore, expanding the trustworthiness escape that currently
exists in the business and the public records context into additional
Rule 803 hearsay exceptions is a reform that is “just right” to
address many of the contemporary concerns about hearsay doctrine.
With a single stroke of the pen, it could resolve a number of thorny
issues that have plagued multiple exceptions within Rule 803.
Rather than upending the entire system of categorical exceptions or
implementing unique restrictions applicable to only single excep-
tions,288 a trustworthiness expansion promises to remedy defects in
Rule 803 exceptions with both precision and efficiency. More silver
bullet than sledgehammer, an expanded trustworthiness escape
clause could cure many of the imperfections in the Rule 803 excep-
tions decried by its many critics.
3. Reliability Matters
Other critics suggest abrogation of the Rule 803 hearsay excep-
tions altogether, contending that “reliability” of hearsay statements
284. FED. R. EVID. 803(13) (including engravings on rings, urns or burial markers, and
inscriptions on portraits).
285. FED. R. EVID. 803(19).
286. 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, § 8:103.
287. Id.
288. See supra Part I.A.
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is unimportant or that the hearsay statements permitted by some
of the most frequently used Rule 803 exceptions lack any empiri-
cally supported reliability.289 But questions of reliability are inex-
tricably intertwined with hearsay doctrine, and a hearsay reform by
way of the trustworthiness exception targets the value most critical
to the admissibility of hearsay admitted through Rule 803.290
Scholars have long questioned the propriety of utilizing “reliabil-
ity” as a basis for admitting or rejecting hearsay.291 Recently,
Professor Sevier suggested that “procedural fairness” represents the
true value underlying the hearsay prohibition and should be the
only value utilized in defining hearsay doctrine.292 Professor Sevier
opines that only the procedural fairness created by face-to-face
confrontation justifies the rule against hearsay.293 According to
Professor Sevier’s conclusions, it is fundamentally unfair to hold a
party accountable based upon hearsay statements that cannot be
cross-examined in court, regardless of the reliability of those out-of-
court statements.294 Of course, the Sixth Amendment provides
criminal defendants with constitutional protection beyond the
hearsay rules that confers such a procedural right to confront
witnesses regardless of reliability.295 While it is true that a similar
purely procedural approach to the hearsay rules could enhance the
predictability and consistency of hearsay rulings, there are several
reasons why reliability should continue to count in the hearsay
calculus.296
First and foremost, Professor Sevier’s conclusions about hearsay
doctrine are based upon a false dichotomy, suggesting that hearsay
289. See supra Part I.A.
290. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules (noting that
Rule 803 exceptions are premised “upon the [notion] that under appropriate circumstances
a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to
justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial”).
291. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 105, at 27. 
292. Sevier, supra note 2, at 688-89.
293. Id. at 689.
294. See id. at 678, 687-88. Professor Sevier’s philosophy would align admissibility of all
hearsay with the Sixth Amendment approach to testimonial hearsay in Crawford. See id. at
648, 663-64 (suggesting the exclusion of uncross-examined testimonial hearsay in civil cases).
295. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
296. See Richter, supra note 30, at 1905 (positing that a move toward a procedural model
could eliminate slippery considerations of reliability). 
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rules must be driven by either procedural justice or reliability.297 In
reality, the fundamental justification for hearsay doctrine is binary,
firmly grounded in both procedural justice and reliability.298 Face-to-
face cross-examination creates legitimacy because it affords an
opponent the opportunity to expose defects in testimony and to test
the reliability of a witness’s account.299 The hearsay prohibition
rests on the concern that statements made without the benefit of
that testing are of questionable reliability.300 Hearsay doctrine
should, therefore, aim to maximize both procedural fairness and
reliability. Accordingly, considerations of reliability that serve as
the basis for the majority of the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions are
highly relevant to sound hearsay doctrine. A trustworthiness excep-
tion geared toward assessing the particularized reliability of hear-
say statements admitted through Rule 803 would advance this
fundamental hearsay value.
A trustworthiness exception within Rule 803 would also enhance
procedural fairness beyond that offered by the existing regime.
While a trustworthiness exception would not provide face-to-face
cross-examination of hearsay admitted through Rule 803, it would
provide some mechanism for opponents of hearsay evidence to
challenge the reliability assumptions embedded in the categorical
hearsay exceptions for particular hearsay statements. Under the
existing rules, opponents of much-maligned present sense impres-
sions and excited utterances possess no right to challenge the
admissibility of hearsay satisfying those exceptions on reliability
grounds.301 Thus, a trustworthiness exception advances procedural
fairness, as well as the inherent reliability of admitted hearsay.
Other critics of the Rule 803 exceptions argue that, even if
reliability counts, the specific reliability assumptions underlying
many of the categorical exceptions in Rule 803 are empirically
297. See Sevier, supra note 2, at 647.
298. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, § 8:3 (explaining that the hearsay
prohibition stems from the idea that cross-examination can reveal risks of deception, forget-
fulness, misperception, and ambiguity and noting that hearsay exceptions allow trustworthy
statements thought to present reduced risks). Additional justifications support the existing
hearsay exceptions as well. See Saltzburg, supra note 235, at 1488.
299. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57.
300. See id. at 61.
301. See McCormick, supra note 103, at 512.
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bankrupt and supported only by “folk psychology.”302 An argument
that some statements, which qualify as present sense impressions
or excited utterances, could be unreliable undoubtedly has merit.
But any argument that the reliability of such statements is wholly
unsupported is hyperbolic. Recent reviews of social science research
provide some support for the reliability assumptions inherent in the
present sense impression exception, the excited utterance exception,
and other Rule 803 exceptions.303
Not surprisingly, when it comes to lying practice makes perfect.
Rehearsed lies are easier and more likely to be told.304 Two of the
most criticized Rule 803 hearsay exceptions—present sense
impressions and excited utterances—include requirements specifi-
cally designed to eliminate the possibility of planned or rehearsed
lies. The timing requirement of the present sense impression excep-
tion, which demands contemporaneous observation and description,
prevents the possibility of rehearsal or planning.305 By insisting that
the declarant speak while “under the stress of excitement” caused
by a startling event, the excited utterance exception also eliminates
planned or rehearsed hearsay statements.306
Further, the literature supports the self-evident proposition that
attention to a particular event also improves accuracy.307 The con-
temporaneous observation and statement required by the present
sense impression ensures that a declarant will focus her attention
on the event at the time of the statement.308 Likewise, requiring that
the declarant remain under the stress of a startling event guaran-
tees that the declarant’s attention will remain on the startling event
at the time she makes a statement relating to it.309 For the state of
302. See United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 796-97 (7th Cir. 2014).
303. See, e.g., Timothy T. Lau, Reliability of Present Sense Impression Hearsay Evidence,
52 GONZ. L. REV. 175, 205 (2017). 
304. Id. at 194 (“Lies may be made easier with preparation and rehearsal.”).
305. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules (“[S]ubstan-
tial contemporaneity of event and statement negate the likelihood of deliberate or conscious
misrepresentation.”).
306. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2); id. 803(2) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
307. Lau, supra note 303, at 203 (“[R]esearch suggests that attention generally facilitates
accurate perception.”). 
308. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules; Lau, supra
note 303, at 204 (stating that present sense impressions “generally should be supported by
the force of attention”).
309. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
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mind exception in Rule 803(3), the declarant must recount a “then-
existing state of mind ... emotion[ ], sens[ation], or physical condi-
tion,” again ensuring that the declarant’s attention will be focused
on the sensations he is relating.310 For statements made concerning
medical history, causation, and symptoms for the purpose of obtain-
ing medical treatment or diagnosis, there is also some assurance
that the speaker will be focused on his health as he relates this in-
formation.311
The literature on lying also reveals that it most often involves
casual social untruths.312 Many of the subjects embraced by the Rule
803 hearsay exceptions, by definition, exclude hearsay statements
involving casual social remarks. For example, Rule 803(4) covers
statements of past and present symptoms that are reasonably pert-
inent to medical treatment or diagnosis and made for that purpose,
eliminating the possibility of casual social remarks satisfying the
exception.313 Likewise, “[a] statement relating to a startling event”
while the declarant remains “under the stress” of that event is the
antithesis of the “casual” “social” remark likely to result in lying.314
Even statements that fit Rule 803 exceptions with fewer restrictions
on subject matter, like the present sense impression that allows a
description of any event or condition,315 are also less likely to be
relevant to later litigation if they are truly casual social observa-
tions. A present sense impression complimenting an acquaintance’s
clothing would rarely prove relevant for its truth in a federal
lawsuit.316
Lastly, social science predictably suggests that a declarant’s
motivation is the key to lying.317 It turns out that a human can lie
310. FED. R. EVID. 803(3) (emphasis added).
311. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
312. See Lau, supra note 303, at 187 (“[M]ost people tell few lies, and those lies which are
told are generally not serious, are made in the context of everyday social interactions, and
involve little planning and little regret.”).
313. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee’s note to the 1972 proposed rules.
314. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
315. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
316. See Richter, supra note 30, at 1901-02 (questioning whether a lie to a neighbor about
his dog’s beauty could ever satisfy the present sense impression exception or be relevant to
any litigated dispute); see also Lau, supra note 303, at 199-200 (similarly questioning whether
Judge Posner’s hypothetical would be admissible or relevant). 
317. Lau, supra note 303, at 187 (“[E]xistence of a motivation to lie is a key determinant.”).
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quite quickly or tell the truth after much reflection.318 What really
counts is the speaker’s recognition of self-interest and motivation to
fabricate at the time of the statement.319 Hearsay exceptions like
803(1), (2), and (4) were crafted to minimize the impact of a declar-
ant’s motivation and self-interest. The strict timing requirement of
the present sense impression was designed to minimize a declar-
ant’s opportunity to develop and recognize any motive to falsify a
description or explanation of a contemporaneously observed event
or condition.320 Likewise, the declarant’s startled state, as required
by the excited utterance exception, was designed to minimize the
effects of potential motivations to shade or distort.321 A declarant’s
strong motive to provide truthful information in seeking medical
treatment underlies the hearsay exception for reasonably pertinent
statements made in seeking medical help.322 The contours of the
Rule 803 exceptions that minimize the likelihood of declarant-
recognized motivations to fabricate justify the continuing presump-
tive admissibility of the hearsay within those exceptions.
However, it is in connection with the declarant’s recognized
motivations that many of the Rule 803 exceptions have the potential
to fall short in certain situations. A declarant who immediately
comprehends the potential future implications of an event could
make a self-interested present sense impression or excited utter-
ance.323 A declarant’s motive to avoid culpability or embarrassment
could cause her to lie to her doctor even while seeking treatment.324
In these circumstances, a trustworthiness exception could serve to
ameliorate motivationally suspect statements that otherwise fit
within the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions. The business records excep-
tion in Rule 803(6) was crafted to minimize the admissibility of self-
serving records by demanding that “making the record was a
regular practice” and not a random practice followed only when
318. Id. at 187-90.
319. Id.
320. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
321. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
322. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
323. See Lau, supra note 303, at 190 (stating that a present sense impression declarant
“may be primed to lie” when “there is a benefit to lie readily perceptible”).
324. See id.
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necessary to protect an unusual business concern.325 Still, the
business records exception already includes a trustworthiness
exception due to the potential for some businesses to implement a
policy of regularly creating and maintaining self-serving records.326
A broader trustworthiness exception would take the same pragmatic
approach to additional Rule 803 exceptions and similarly allow
opponents of hearsay falling within these traditional categories to
examine and highlight the motivations of the particular hearsay
declarants in the specific context that created the hearsay state-
ments, thereby increasing rationality of hearsay doctrine.
Therefore, notwithstanding vocal critics who complain that the
Rule 803 hearsay exceptions are “dubious” or “empirically bank-
rupt,”327 the social sciences literature lends some support for many
of the reliability assumptions enshrined in the Rule 803 hearsay
exceptions. Where that literature does reveal weaknesses in those
assumptions—with respect to hearsay statements by declarants
with demonstrable motivations to distort or lie—a trustworthiness
escape clause would align the Rule 803 exceptions with the human
reality by providing a mechanism to exclude only those particular
statements.
4. Systemic Symmetry
Adding a trustworthiness exception to the Rule 803 hearsay
exceptions would also create much-needed systemic symmetry in
the Article Eight hearsay regime. One of the principal arguments
against categorical hearsay exceptions like those in Rule 803 when
the original Rules were debated, was the impossibility of identifying
reliable hearsay statements in advance through rigid rules.328 As
described above, noted evidence authority Charles McCormick
captured this criticism perfectly when he wrote, “[T]he values of
hearsay declarations or writings, and the need for them, in particu-
lar situations cannot with any degree of realism be thus minutely
325. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6); id. 803(6) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
326. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules (“[H]esita-
tion must be experienced in admitting everything which is observed and recorded in the
course of a regularly conducted activity.”).
327. See supra Part I.A.
328. See CAPRA, supra note 227, at 48.
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ticketed in advance.... Too much worthless evidence will fit the
categories, too much that is vitally needed will be left out.”329
In essence, Professor McCormick opined that categorical hearsay
exceptions would be simultaneously underinclusive—omitting par-
ticular valuable and reliable hearsay statements from coverage, as
well as overinclusive—approving in advance certain hearsay state-
ments that may be unworthy of admission when viewed in their
specific factual contexts.330 Although the drafters of the Rules
ultimately proposed categorical hearsay exceptions, they humbly
responded to this critique by proposing the catchall or residual
exception to ensure a hearsay model that was not irrationally
rigid.331 Pursuant to the residual exception, a trial judge may admit
hearsay evidence that does not fall within the parameters of the
categorical exceptions so long as the hearsay shares “equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.”332 The residual
exception thus responds to the criticism that categorical exceptions
will necessarily be underinclusive.
The residual hearsay exception, of course, only partially responds
to Professor McCormick’s critique and ignores the possibility that
the categorical hearsay exceptions may be overinclusive. While
recognizing their limitations in making ex ante decisions about
which hearsay should be admitted, the drafters of the Rules failed
to recognize those same limitations with respect to decisions about
which hearsay statements to exclude. Much of the long-standing and
ongoing criticism of the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions stems from this
drafting imbalance. Scholars and judges routinely note the fallibility
329. McCormick, supra note 103, at 512.
330. Id. (advocating a discretionary approach to hearsay evidence and criticizing “sharp
categories” of hearsay exceptions as “strange”); see also Morgan, supra note 105, at 38-47
(describing how much probative evidence the hearsay rule excludes and how much unreliable
evidence of low probative value the categorical hearsay exceptions permit); Weinstein, supra
note 102, at 337 (“Wigmore’s rationale ... makes admissible a class of hearsay rather than
particular hearsay for which, in the circumstances of the case, there is need and assurance
of reliability.” (emphasis added)).
331. FED. R. EVID. 807.
332. FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(1). The residual exception also demands hearsay that “is offered
as evidence of a material fact,” that “is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts,” and that “will
best serve ... the interests of justice.” FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(2)-(4). The Advisory Committee has
been reviewing Rule 807 in the past year to consider possible amendments. See Capra
Memorandum on Expanding the Residual Exception, supra note 9.
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of the reliability assumptions embedded in the Rule 803 exceptions
in particular.333 Many have noted the possibility that some hearsay
statements satisfying all requirements for admissibility might
nonetheless be untrustworthy in light of a particular factual
context.334 The drafters of Article Eight created an escape valve to
allow the admission of reliable hearsay that cannot make it through
the necessarily limited and preordained categorical exceptions. But
they left no escape mechanism for courts and litigants confronted
with unreliable hearsay falling squarely within the rigid and
preordained categorical exceptions.
The tension and distrust caused by the admissibility of hearsay
perceived to be untrustworthy through the Rule 803 exceptions
creates intolerable pressure that infects the entire hearsay regime.
Indeed, Pascal’s law of fluid mechanics illustrates the impact of
rigid categorical hearsay exceptions that allow no discretion to
exclude qualifying hearsay statements on the hearsay system as a
whole. According to Pascal’s Law,
[W]hen the pressure at any point in a static fluid in a closed
system is changed, the change in pressure will disperse equally
throughout the fluid....
....
... Pascal himself showed that it worked by filling a barrel
with water and inserting a long pipe into the top. When he
poured water into the top of the pipe, the barrel burst. The
weight of the water in the pipe caused an increase in pressure
inside the barrel that pushed against the sides until they gave
way.335
Although the categorical exceptions represent an open system
with respect to the admission of hearsay due to the residual excep-
tion, they represent Pascal’s closed system with respect to the exclu-
sion of unreliable hearsay satisfying their requirements. Rule 803
is akin to Pascal’s barrel of water, filled with the inherently reliable
hearsay it was designed to accept. Any time a court admits a
333. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
334. See supra Part I.A.
335. What Is Pascal’s Law?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.org/what-is-pascals-law.htm
[https://perma.cc/3H8Q-BDK4]; see also PIJUSH K. KUNDU & IRA M. COHEN, FLUID MECHANICS
10-11 (4th ed. 2008). 
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patently unreliable hearsay statement through the Rule 803
exceptions, intolerable pressure builds. The resulting explosion of
distrust bleeds into the entire Article Eight regime. Adding a
trustworthiness exception to the Rule 803 exceptions, where
reliability critiques remain unaddressed, would release the stress
on the hearsay system by allowing flexibility in both the exclusion
and admission of hearsay evidence. Such systemic symmetry would
do much to increase the rationality of the Article Eight hearsay
regime and the confidence in the integrity of the system, allowing
it to function at a more optimal level.
5. Certainty and Predictability Retained
Adding needed “flexibility” to the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions
raises the specter of unbridled judicial discretion in the administra-
tion of hearsay doctrine that could threaten the critical predictabil-
ity and consistency of the system.336 A purely discretionary approach
to the Rule 803 exceptions would pose all of the problems of the
Posner proposal, albeit in a more limited context.337 Importantly,
adding a trustworthiness escape hatch to the existing Rule 803
hearsay exceptions will not sacrifice the crucial predictability and
consistency necessary to efficient litigation. An expanded trustwor-
thiness exception in the Rule 803 hearsay categories will not
transform those exceptions into mere guidelines or illustrations for
trial judges to follow at their discretion. Instead, the well-settled
operation of the existing trustworthiness exceptions in the business
and the public records categories will limit an expanded trustwor-
thiness provision in a manner that will prevent unbridled judicial
discretion and promote predictability.
In other words, the existing requirements of the Rule 803 hearsay
exceptions would continue to drive admissibility. A proponent of
hearsay relying on any Rule 803 exception would first have to
demonstrate that the proffered hearsay statement satisfies the
threshold requirements for admissibility. Once a proponent makes
that showing, the proffered hearsay becomes presumptively
336. See Richter, supra note 30, at 1885-86 (exploring the costs associated with a discre-
tionary hearsay system).
337. See generally United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 799-802 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner,
J., concurring).
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admissible.338 Only then would a court permit an opponent of the
hearsay to launch a challenge to trustworthiness. The opponent of
the hearsay would bear the burden of overcoming the presumption
of admissibility by pointing to specific facts or circumstances
undermining the reliability of the specific statement.339 The 2014
amendments to Rules 803(6), (7), and (8) make this roadmap for
admissibility explicit and mandatory with respect to the existing
trustworthiness exceptions found in those Rules.340
In evaluating trustworthiness challenges under the business and
the public records exceptions, most federal courts adopted this
analytical structure even before the 2014 amendments.341 Although
opponents of business and public records need not produce evidence
to demonstrate a lack of trustworthiness, courts have required
opponents to point to specific circumstances undermining the tra-
ditional and presumed trustworthiness of these records.342 Courts
have examined proffered circumstances carefully and have rejected
trustworthiness challenges regularly, despite alleged problems with
methodology or completeness.343
When examining the federal cases in which trustworthiness chal-
lenges have resulted in the exclusion of otherwise admissible busi-
ness and public records, clear patterns emerge. Demonstrated bias
in the authors of, or contributors to, business and public records will
likely result in exclusion. When a report by the Urban Mass Transit
Administration parroted the proposed safety modifications of a
party with a clear interest in avoiding massive liability, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the exclusion of the public record
338. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendments (“[T]he
basic admissibility requirements are sufficient to establish a presumption that the record is
reliable.”).
339. See id. (noting the burden on the opponent to demonstrate a lack of trustworthiness
and that the opponent need not introduce “affirmative evidence of untrustworthiness”).
340. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6)-(8) advisory committee’s notes to 2014 amendments.
341. See id. (explaining that most courts imposed this burden on the opponent of the hear-
say even prior to the amendment).
342. Cf. 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, § 8:83 (“[M]any more decisions cite
trustworthiness as a reason to admit records than untrustworthiness as a reason to exclude.
Few reported opinions openly speak of excluding business records where the specific
requirements are met.”). 
343. See, e.g., Dortch v. Fowler, 588 F.3d 396, 403-04 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Reyes, 157 F.3d 949, 953 (2d Cir. 1998); Ellis v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 301-04 (4th
Cir. 1984).
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under the trustworthiness escape clause in Rule 803(8).344 When an
insurance adjustor’s report was prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the trial court
erred in admitting it over a trustworthiness objection.345 Similarly,
courts have excluded public records that would otherwise be
admissible when the opponent can demonstrate circumstances
calling into question the finality or validity or the reports.346 In the
absence of these types of circumstances, trustworthiness challenges
to business and public records are likely to fail.
A review of the federal cases decided under the existing trustwor-
thiness escape clauses in Rules 803(6) and (8) reveals that these
provisions have not transformed those hearsay exceptions into
inconsistent or unpredictable, standardless guidelines. Given the
well-established demands on an opponent raising a trustworthiness
challenge, such challenges are not routine or pro forma whenever a
party employs the business or public records exceptions. Parties
routinely utilize both exceptions without any objection to trustwor-
thiness. Furthermore, parties can predict in advance the likely
outcome of any such challenge based upon the careful analysis of
these challenges in the federal opinions.
Although an expanded trustworthiness escape in Rule 803 would
undoubtedly broaden trial judge discretion in overseeing the Rule
803 hearsay exceptions, it poses little threat of allowing unfair and
unguided notions of general reliability to supplant those longstand-
ing exceptions. Federal courts will have an established structure
upon which to rely in evaluating trustworthiness, with the burden
squarely on the opponent of the hearsay evidence. Additionally,
federal courts may draw on recognized factors undermining
reliability—most notably demonstrated motivational defects—in
deciding whether to exclude hearsay evidence.
To a large extent, timing is everything. Expanding the trustwor-
thiness escape to additional Rule 803 exceptions following forty-plus
years of careful application in the context of the business and the
344. City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir. 1981).
345. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Sinkovich, 232 F.3d 200, 205 (4th Cir.
2000). 
346. Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1275 (7th Cir. 1988) (upholding
exclusion of Bureau of Flight Standards Release when the opponent demonstrated that the
Release had been “cancelled” by the Federal Aviation Administration). 
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public records exceptions ensures a predictable blueprint to govern
and limit an expanded trustworthiness clause. Including a trustwor-
thiness escape for all Rule 803 exceptions in the original draft of the
Federal Rules of Evidence may have dramatically altered the
character of the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions, leading trial judges to
treat them as disfavored and discretionary rather than as prescrip-
tive and definitive. Since their adoption in 1975, the Rule 803
exceptions have gained a solid foothold as categorical and authorita-
tive exceptions to the prohibition on hearsay. Starting with
trustworthiness escape clauses in only the business and public
records contexts rendered use of those clauses unique and excep-
tional.347 Now that the nature of that trustworthiness escape feature
is also established as a rare exception to presumptive admissi-
bility,348 the trustworthiness clause is well positioned to help resolve
long-standing concerns about the overinclusive operation of some of
the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions. Given the evolutionary develop-
ment of the Rules, therefore, trial judges and litigants are primed
to continue recognizing the hearsay within the Rule 803 exceptions
as presumptively admissible with a rare opportunity to exclude for
opponents who can show a lack of trustworthiness even after the
addition of a trustworthiness escape.
Indeed, some states have expanded application of the trustworthi-
ness exception within their state counterparts to Rule 803 without
sacrificing the predictable application of those hearsay exceptions.
Florida Evidence Rule 90.803(1), the state equivalent of the present
sense impression exception, contains an exception to admissibility
when “circumstances ... indicate [a] lack of trustworthiness.”349
According to the Florida Supreme Court, “This provision enables the
judge to bar the admission of statements that lack sufficient reli-
ability. The drafters were particularly concerned with statements by
unidentified bystanders. The court should weigh any corroborating
347. FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(E), (7)(C), (8)(B); supra Part II.B.
348. See supra Part II.B.
349. Compare FED. R. EVID. 803(1), with FLA. STAT. § 90.803(1) (2017) (“A spontaneous
statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was per-
ceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter, except when such statement is made
under circumstances that indicate its lack of trustworthiness.” (emphasis added)).
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evidence together with all other factors in making this determina-
tion.”350
Notwithstanding the trustworthiness exception, the application
of the present sense impression exception in Florida largely mirrors
its application under Rule 803(1).351 Only in rare cases have Florida
courts utilized the trustworthiness exception to exclude a statement
that otherwise appears to meet the stated requirements of a present
sense impression.352 Ohio Evidence Rule 803(1) also contains a
trustworthiness exception.353 According to the Ohio Evidence
Advisory Committee, the Ohio exception vested the trial judge with
discretion to exclude untrustworthy present sense impressions in an
effort to “narrow[ ] the availability of this exception.”354 Notwith-
standing strong lip service to the trustworthiness exception in
several Ohio appellate court opinions, the Ohio present sense
impression exception reaches results similar to those that would be
reached under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) in most cases.355
Therefore, the experience of those states that have expanded a
trustworthiness exception to additional Rule 803 hearsay excep-
tions reveals no threat to the continued consistent and predictable
350. Deparvine v. State, 995 So. 2d 351, 368 (Fla. 2008) (quoting 7 CHARLES W. EHRHARDT,
FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 803.1 (2007)).
351. See, e.g., Alexander v. State, 627 So. 2d 35, 36, 43-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (per
curiam) (reversing a murder conviction of a teenager based on the exclusion of the defendant’s
self-exculpatory statements and finding nothing to suggest that the defendant’s statements
were lacking in apparent trustworthiness notwithstanding their exculpatory tendencies).
352. See, e.g., Overton v. State, 429 So. 2d 722, 723 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming a
trial court’s exclusion of a defendant’s statement to a deputy upon arrest that he was “the
wrong guy” and that the “right guy” was “get[ting] away” because the statement was “self-
serving and made under circumstances ... indicat[ing] its lack of trustworthiness”). 
353. OHIO EVID. R. 803(1) (“A statement describing or explaining an event or condition
made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter
unless circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.” (emphasis added)).
354. OHIO EVID. R. 803 staff notes. The drafters of Ohio Evidence Rule 803(1) may have
taken a more restrictive view of the present sense impression because no Ohio case had direct-
ly recognized the exception prior to the enactment of the Ohio rules. Id.
355. See, e.g., State v. McNeal, No. 1-01-158, 2002 WL 1376177, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. June
18, 2002) (affirming admission of 911 caller’s statements pursuant to the present sense
impression exception over trustworthiness challenge); State v. Penland, 724 N.E.2d 841, 844,
846 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (affirming the admission of the police officer’s contemporaneous
description over shoulder-mounted radio of pursuit of the defendant and of the defendant’s
possession of a firearm as a present sense impression); State v. Wages, 623 N.E.2d 193, 198
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (affirming admission of the victim’s statement over the phone that the
defendant “had just pulled into her driveway” over a trustworthiness challenge).
2018] GOLDILOCKS AND THE RULE 803 HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS 961
application of those exceptions. Instead, the trustworthiness clause
empowers courts to exclude particular hearsay satisfying the
traditional requirements of the Rule 803 exceptions in rare circum-
stances where that hearsay falls demonstrably short of the reliabil-
ity ideal.
Examples outside the Rule 803 context also support this predic-
tion about continued consistency and certainty in the operation of
Rule 803 with an expanded trustworthiness exception. As previously
discussed, the original Rules vested trial judges with discretion to
admit reliable hearsay not covered by the categorical exceptions by
including a residual exception.356 Recent research suggests that
courts have exercised that discretion cautiously and have avoided
wielding that power in a way that would create uncertainty and
inconsistency.357 This hearsay-specific experience with judicial dis-
cretion suggests that a carefully cabined trustworthiness exception
would be handled with similar caution.
Controlled flexibility, therefore, need not sacrifice clear and
predictable rules and outcomes. There is no reason to expect that
affording a structured and controlled exception to the well-settled
Rule 803 hearsay exceptions will undermine the predictability and
consistency critical in the administration of hearsay doctrine.
6. Do Not Upset the Whole Apple Cart
Expansion of the existing trustworthiness exception already
embodied in Rules 803(6)-(8) represents a modest adjustment to the
hearsay regime that will not throw the operation of hearsay doctrine
into disarray. Litigants and judges are already familiar with this
existing feature of the hearsay rules and can be expected to incor-
porate it seamlessly into the existing fabric of hearsay doctrine.
Evidence of the disruptive nature of a complete paradigm shift is
readily available in the wake of the Crawford revolution in Confron-
tation Clause jurisprudence.358 Where the Crawford standard is
356. See FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendments (explaining Rule
807 was formerly 803(24) and 804(b)(5)).
357. See Capra Memorandum on Expanding the Residual Exception, supra note 9, at 17-18
(describing the restrictive application of the residual exception by federal courts). 
358. See Richter, supra note 30, at 1903 (noting the continuing uncertainties and ambigu-
ities playing out in the wake of Crawford).
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grounded on a constitutional mandate, the inefficiencies and
reversals inherent in that transition become irrelevant.359 Any
complete overhaul of the recognized and complex hearsay regime is
certain to condemn litigants, judges, and justices to a lengthy period
of confusion and adaptation. Where a hearsay paradigm-shift is not
constitutionally mandated, the certain and destructive effect on
practice counsels against such a sweeping reform. The addition of
a recognized trustworthiness exception to the existing hearsay
regime poses no threat of disruption and upheaval, further recom-
mending it as a palliative for the ailments of Rule 803.
III. RATIONALIZING RULE 803: DRAFTING ALTERNATIVES
It is all fun and games until you have to draft a rule that will
achieve its intended purpose without creating unintended collateral
consequences or interpretive conundrums. With regard to modifying
the well-understood, but often-criticized, character rules, the Su-
preme Court famously noted:
[M]uch of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full of compro-
mises and compensations by which an irrational advantage to
one side is offset by a poorly reasoned counterprivilege to the
other. But somehow it has proved a workable even if clumsy
system when moderated by discretionary controls in the hands
of a wise and strong trial court. To pull one misshapen stone out
of the grotesque structure is more likely simply to upset its
present balance between adverse interests than to establish a
rational edifice.360
Drafting within the complex system of hearsay rules presents
similar challenges, and care must be taken to expand the trustwor-
thiness exception in a clear, efficient manner that does not under-
mine the intended operation of the many exceptions in the Rule 803
category. There are two options for expanding the trustworthiness
exception. First, a blanket trustworthiness exception could be added
to the opening provision of Rule 803 that could be used in con-
junction with any of the twenty-three hearsay exceptions in the
359. See id. at 1903-04.
360. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948).
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provision. Alternatively, specific hearsay exceptions within Rule 803
could be amended to include a new trustworthiness escape clause,
specifically tailored to those exceptions only.
A. The Blanket Approach
A single overarching trustworthiness exception could be added to
the opening provision of Rule 803 that would comprehensively cap-
ture all Rule 803 hearsay exceptions. Such a broad trustworthiness
exception could be justified on the grounds that the entire Rule 803
category of hearsay exceptions is largely premised on notions of
inherent reliability,361 making a trustworthiness challenge uniquely
appropriate throughout the Rule 803 arena. From the standpoint of
systemic symmetry, a trustworthiness exception applicable to the
entire category of hearsay exceptions that is beholden exclusively to
notions of reliability makes good sense.362
There are significant benefits to expanding the trustworthiness
exception in this manner. Such an amendment would be efficient
and elegant, requiring added language only in the opening lines of
the Rule. It would avoid the piecemeal approach of amending
specific exceptions one at a time that would add complexity by lit-
tering Rule 803 with numerous new requirements. It also affords
maximum substantive impact and flexibility by allowing opponents
and judges to use the trustworthiness exception in unforeseen
particularized applications of all Rule 803 hearsay exceptions,
rather than only in contexts where reliability concerns have already
surfaced. A blanket amendment would eliminate the need for addi-
tional amendments to account for future reliability issues.
Such an approach also comes with some potentially negative
consequences, however. Adding a trustworthiness exception to the
opening provision of Rule 803 would render the trustworthiness
language currently part of Rules 803(6)-(8) superfluous and would
require the elimination of that existing language.363 The trustwor-
thiness language in the business and the public records exceptions
has been part of those Rules since their enactment and has recently
361. See Richter, supra note 30, at 1874.
362. See supra Part II.C.4.
363. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(E), (7)(C), (8)(B).
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been updated and clarified.364 There could be substantial resistance
to eliminating these preexisting trustworthiness limits. In addition,
Rule 803(15) covering statements in documents affecting an interest
in property already contains an “unless” clause suggesting that later
dealings with the property that are inconsistent “with the truth of
th[os]e statement[s] or the purport of the document” may render them
inadmissible.365 This clause is in essence a trustworthiness excep-
tion specifically tailored to the hearsay admissible through Rule
803(15) and would likely need to be eliminated or altered in the
wake of a blanket trustworthiness exception covering all Rule 803
exceptions.
In addition, there are hearsay exceptions within Rule 803 that
may not be appropriate for a trustworthiness exception in any
circumstance. For example, Rule 803(5) allows the past recorded
recollection of a forgetful testifying witness to be admitted for its
truth.366 Rule 803(5) requires that the declarant-witness affirm the
accuracy of the recorded statement.367 With both an in-court affirm-
ation of accuracy and an opportunity for the opponent to cross-
examine the declarant, exclusion of a record satisfying Rule 803(5)
on reliability grounds seems unnecessary. As another example, Rule
803(18) covers “[s]tatements in [l]earned [t]reatises, [p]eriodicals, or
[p]amphlets.”368 In order to establish the admissibility of a learned
treatise in the first place, a proponent is required to establish it as
“a reliable authority.”369 It would seem illogical and incoherent to
find that such a treatise meets that threshold reliability require-
ment for admissibility, but that it must be excluded as “untrustwor-
thy” under the particular circumstances. This makes the learned
treatise hearsay exception a poor candidate for a trustworthiness
clause. If there are Rule 803 exceptions which should never give
364. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6), (8) advisory committee’s notes to 2014 amendments (clarify-
ing that the burden of showing a lack of trustworthiness rests on the opponent of hearsay
evidence). 
365. FED. R. EVID. 803(15) (emphasis added).
366. FED. R. EVID. 803(5). The exception permits the proponent to read the recorded
statement into evidence but allows it to “be received as an exhibit only if offered by [the]
adverse party.” Id. 
367. Id. (allowing “[a] record that ... accurately reflects the witness’s knowledge”).
368. FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
369. FED. R. EVID. 803(18)(B).
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way to a trustworthiness challenge, therefore, this counsels against
a blanket approach to a trustworthiness amendment.
Finally, a blanket amendment would require language that would
capture accurately the divergent trustworthiness concerns that may
arise in the numerous and varied contexts presented by the Rule
803 hearsay exceptions. For example, current wording of the
trustworthiness exception in the business records rule that ad-
dresses untrustworthy methods “of preparation” would be ill-suited
to an oral present sense impression or excited utterance admissible
through Rules 803(1) and (2).370 The language in Rule 803(15)
referencing later inconsistent “dealings with the property”371 makes
no sense in connection with the many hearsay exceptions in Rule
803 that operate apart from any property context. Crafting wording
to fit with the multifarious reliability justifications of all Rule 803
exceptions poses a challenge.
That said, a blanket amendment might read:
Rule 803. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay—Regardless
of Whether the Declarant is Available as a Witness
The following statements are not excluded by the rule against
hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a
witness, unless the opponent shows specific facts or circum-
stances regarding the source of information in a statement or the
making of a statement that render it untrustworthy.372
By requiring “specific facts or circumstances,” this amendment
would require opponents to articulate specific contextual reasons for
doubting the reliability of particular hearsay statements being
challenged. By referencing the need for the “opponent” to “show”
such facts or circumstances, the amendment would maintain the
existing burden on the opponent and the crucial presumptive ad-
missibility of hearsay statements satisfying the Rule 803 hearsay
370. Compare FED. R. EVID.  803(6)(E), with FED. R. EVID. 803(1), (2).
371. See FED. R. EVID. 803(15).
372. This proposal emphasizes language that would be added to the existing Rule 803
preamble. See FED. R. EVID. 803. Arguably, this language would not require the abrogation
of the “unless” clause in Rule 803(15) because it would not reach conduct subsequent to the
making of a statement. See FED. R. EVID. 803(15). It would, however, supplant the language
in existing Rules 803(6)-(8). See FED. R. EVID. 803(6)-(8). 
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exceptions.373 By placing this trustworthiness limit in the opening
provision, Rule 803 could eliminate the awkward existing require-
ments in Rules 803(6)-(8) that hearsay is admissible when “the
opponent does not show” a “lack of trustworthiness.”374 Although
this language omits the “method or circumstances of preparation”
language uniquely suited to hearsay in the form of records,375 it con-
tinues to permit a challenge to hearsay records based upon “facts or
circumstances regarding ... the making of a statement,” which is
sufficiently broad to capture methodological defects in preparation.
An advisory committee note to a blanket amendment should
emphasize several points. First, it should highlight the presumptive
admissibility of hearsay statements falling within the Rule 803
hearsay exceptions and explain that the long-standing trustworthi-
ness exceptions from the business and the public records contexts
are simply expanded to the remaining Rule 803 exceptions. The note
should reinforce that the burden remains on the opponent of the
hearsay evidence to demonstrate a lack of trustworthiness376 and
note that specific facts or circumstances undermining the reliability
of the presumptively admissible hearsay are necessary to exclude.
Importantly, a broad expansion of the trustworthiness exception to
all Rule 803 exceptions should emphasize that such an exception is
much more likely to apply to certain Rule 803 exceptions, such as
the present sense impression, excited utterance, and state of mind
exceptions, and should be sparingly applied, if at all, to others.
B. The Exception-Specific Alternative
The alternative to a broadly applicable blanket amendment to
Rule 803 is the addition of a trustworthiness exception in each Rule
803 hearsay exception where it is likely to help the most. There are
significant benefits to this approach. The language of each trustwor-
thiness exception could be specially tailored to fit the hearsay
statements admitted through that exception. Hearsay exceptions
373. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(6)-(8) advisory committee’s notes to 2014 amendments.
374. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(E) (admitting a record if “the opponent does not show
that the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack
of trustworthiness”).
375. See, e.g., id.
376. FED. R. EVID. 803(6)-(8) advisory committee’s notes to 2014 amendments.
2018] GOLDILOCKS AND THE RULE 803 HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS 967
admitting records could reference “methods of preparation,” while
exceptions admitting oral statements could be tailored to “sources
of information” or “motivations of the declarant.” With freestanding
trustworthiness exceptions applicable to only specific exceptions, the
time-honored existing trustworthiness language in the business and
the public records exceptions could remain undisturbed. Most
importantly, trustworthiness amendments within individual Rule
803 exceptions could apply the trustworthiness remedy only where
it is needed the most and thus avoid illogical applications.
Of course, an exception-by-exception approach to trustworthiness
has drawbacks as well. Amendments to multiple exceptions would
be less efficient and would add complexity to the already compli-
cated Rule 803 landscape by altering the methodology applicable to
some Rule 803 exceptions but not others. It likewise would require
tinkering with the language of a number of long-standing Rule 803
exceptions. From a more substantive perspective, an exception-
specific approach to expanded trustworthiness would rigidly permit
exclusion for a lack of reliability only under the amended exceptions.
Should future concerns arise about the reliability of certain hearsay
statements falling within unamended exceptions, additional
amendments to Rule 803 would be necessary. This raises the chal-
lenge inherent in identifying the universe of Rule 803 exceptions
that are most likely to be improved by a trustworthiness clause.
As explored earlier, there are several obvious candidates for a
trustworthiness amendment within Rule 803.377 The present sense
impression and excited utterance exceptions have drawn the most
fire for their potential to admit unreliable hearsay.378 Any expansion
of the trustworthiness exception should start in Rules 803(1) and
803(2). As discussed above, a trustworthiness escape clause could
also improve the hearsay exceptions for state of mind statements
and statements for medical diagnosis or treatment.379 These, too,
should be added to the list for exception-specific amendments. Still
other exceptions, like those for ancient documents or family records,
could benefit in some circumstances from an opportunity to defeat
their wholesale admissibility.380
377. See supra Part II. 
378. See supra Part I.A.
379. See supra Part II.C.2.
380. See supra Part II.C.2.
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Whichever specific exceptions are selected ultimately, a uniform
Advisory Committee note could be drafted to accompany these
amendments. Like the note accompanying a blanket amendment,
this note would focus litigants and judges on the presumptive ad-
missibility of hearsay within the affected exceptions, the burden on
the opponent to defeat that presumptive admissibility, and the
factors to be utilized in evaluating a trustworthiness challenge.
CONCLUSION
Although the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules has been
content to leave the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions largely alone up to
now, the controversy surrounding those exceptions is unlikely to
abate. Should pressure continue to build around the Rule 803
hearsay exceptions and the rationality of hearsay doctrine more
generally, the Committee should not scuttle the entire hearsay
regime or pile on specific hurdles to block the use of long-standing
and needed hearsay exceptions within that regime. Instead, an
expanded trustworthiness limit on the Rule 803 exceptions could
prove to be the hearsay reform that is “just right” to address truly
narrow critiques of a limited slice of the whole hearsay picture.
